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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the occurrence of active shooter incidents has become more 
prevalent within the United States. Since the Virginia Tech massacre in 2007, there has 
been an increase in active shooter incidents at institutions of higher learning (IHLs). 
Educational settings have been identified by the FBI as the second most common place 
for active shooter incidents to occur. As a result, there has become an increased need for 
administrators at IHLs to create and maintain cultures of preparedness that include 
effective active shooter training. In this research study, Albert Bandura’s Social 
Cognitive Theory was used as a framework to explore faculty active shooter 
preparedness. A cross-sectional survey design was used to examine the environmental 
factors, behaviors, and personal and cognitive factors that contributed to faculty active 
shooter preparedness. A snowball sampling method was used to recruit participants for 
this study. This study was conducted in May of 2018. Participants completed the Faculty 
Active Shooter Preparedness Survey (FASPS) online. Findings from the FASPS revealed 
that only 57% of the respondents received active shooter training from their institution. In 
conjunction with that, about half of the respondents perceived themselves as being 
prepared for active shooter incidents on campus. Additionally, findings revealed that 
active shooter training at IHLs was limited to discussion-based training exercises and 
operations-based training exercises were rarely conducted. As a result, there is a need to 
improve the active shooter preparation efforts among IHLs, so that all faculty are 
prepared for the onset of an active shooter incident on campus. There is also a need to 
ensure that active shooter preparation efforts align with the U.S. Department of Education 
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and U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s active shooter preparation 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION 
The active shooter epidemic at institutions of higher learning (IHLs) began in 
1966 when Charles Whitman, a student at the University of Texas, killed his family, 
proceeded to the university’s iconic tower, and began randomly shooting individuals who 
were walking across the campus (Stearns, 2008). During this incident, over 30 people 
were wounded, and 13 people were killed. Forty-one years later, over 30 people were 
killed, and several others were wounded during an active shooter incident at Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute (Fox & Savage, 2009; Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008; Stearns, 2008). 
The Virginia Tech massacre is known as one of the deadliest active shooter incidents in 
the history of the United States. The United States Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) (2008) defined an active shooter as, “an individual actively engaged in killing or 
attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, active shooters 
use firearms and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims” (p. 2). The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) definition of active shooter coincides with the 
DHS’s definition of active shooter (OPS Active Shooter Guide, n.d.; U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008).  
The number of active shooter incidents at IHLs has risen substantially during the 
21st century (Blair & Scheweit, 2013; Booker, 2014; Campo-Flores, Carlton & 
Emshwiller, 2015; Fox & Savage, 2009; Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011; Sullivan, 2012; 
Wang & Hutchins, 2010). In 2013, the FBI reported that 70% of the active shooter 
incidents that occurred in the United States between the years of 2000 and 2013, occurred 
in educational settings (Blair & Scheweit, 2013). The FBI also reported that as of 
September 8, 2016, between the years of 2000 and 2016, 16 active shooter incidents 
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occurred on college campuses (2016). Since the 1966 University of Texas tragedy, seven 
of these IHL active shooter incidents were mass shootings that resulted in mass casualties 
(see Table 1).  
Table 1  
Active Shooter Incidents on College Campuses Resulting in Mass Casualties 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Year  Institution    Fatalities  Wounded 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1966  University of TX   31   18 
1976  CA State University, Fullerton 7   2 
1991  University of Iowa   5   1 
2007  VA Tech    32   25 
2008  Northern Illinois University  5   21 
2012  Oikos University   7   3 
2013  Santa Monica College*  6   4 
2015  Umpqua Community College  9   7 
Note. *This shooting did not occur solely on a college campus. 
Apart from the 1966 massacre at the University of Texas, the 1976 California State 
University shooting, and the 1991 shooting at the University of Iowa, all of the mass 
shooting incidents that have occurred on college campuses, occurred between the years of 
2006 and 2016 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016).  
Active shooter incidents on college campuses are unpredictable, can negatively 
impact institutions, and can be detrimental to members of the campus community 
(Booker, 2014; Moats, Chermack & Dooley, 2008; Wang & Hutchins, 2010). Indeed, the 
DHS and FBI have stated that active shooter incidents progress swiftly and are at times 
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unforeseeable (OPS Active Shooter Guide, n.d.; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2008). As such, these incidents are major crisis situations for IHLs. The prevalence of 
active shooter incidents on college campuses has caused IHLs to place more focus on 
campus security and institutional active shooter preparedness.  
Overview of Theoretical Framework 
Active shooter training (AST) plays a major role in preparing individuals to 
engage in active shooter situations (Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools 
Technical Assistance Center, n.d.; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). As a 
result of the potential threat of active shooter incidents on college campuses, institutions 
across the nation are providing AST to their faculty and staff (Action Guide for 
Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010). To frame literature 
pertaining to the aforementioned, Albert Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) is 
used as the framework for examining faculty members’ active shooter preparedness in 
this study. In accordance with Bandura, faculty members’ environment, personal and 
cognitive factors, and behaviors all play a role in their active shooter preparedness. SCT 
focuses on observational learning and the reciprocal interaction between individuals’ 
environment, personal and cognitive factors and behaviors (Bandura, 1986). SCT 
suggests that individuals can learn and may modify their perceptions and behaviors as a 
result of observing others (Bandura, 1986). ASTs serve as observational learning 
experiences because these trainings are comprised of a variety of learning experiences 
that enable faculty members’ to vicariously engage in active shooter incidents. ASTs and 
active shooter incidents that occur on college campuses both serve as observational 
learning experiences that may affect faculty’s environment, personal and cognitive 
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factors and behaviors . SCT will be used to examine the extent to which participating in 
AST influences faculty members’ environment, personal and cognitive factors and 
behaviors.   
Problem Statement 
As has been mentioned, campus shootings have become more prevalent in United 
States’ IHLs (Blair & Scheweit, 2013; Booker, 2014; Campo-Flores et al., 2015; Fox & 
Savage, 2009; Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011; Sullivan, 2012; Wang & Hutchins, 2010). 
Although this is a multifaceted problem in higher education, active shooter trainings 
(ASTs) are essential to equipping personnel with the necessary information, resources, 
and tools that are needed to manage active shooter incidents (Readiness and Emergency 
Management for Schools Technical Assistance Center, n.d.). The Readiness and 
Emergency Management for Schools Technical Assistance Center reported that only a 
small number of institutions conduct training for active shooter situations (n.d.). 
Likewise, IHLs have failed and continue to fail to comply with the campus safety and 
security measures that have been mandated by the federal government (Booker, 2014; 
Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011; Sullivan, 2012; Wang & Hutchins, 2010; Zdziarski, 2001).  
Active shooter preparedness falls under the larger scope of crisis management. 
Literature on crisis management in higher education indicated that additional research is 
needed. In 2010, Wang & Hutchins reported that crisis management was a new research 
field in human resource development. Their research indicated that overall institutions 
lacked crisis management plans. In 2012, Sullivan found that emergency management in 
higher education needed to be more robust. He also suggested that additional research in 
this area should be conducted to obtain a clearer picture of the status of crisis 
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management in higher education. Booker reported in 2014 that there was still limited 
research on crisis management in higher education. He explained that there is limited 
research because higher education institutions are reactive in their crisis management 
planning (Booker, 2014). More specifically, research pertaining specifically to faculty 
active shooter preparedness and active shooter training is missing from the literature. 
Implications 
The results of this study have both theoretical and practical implications for 
administrators and faculty at IHLs. From the institutional standpoint, theoretically the 
results of this study may help administrators improve upon their faculty active shooter 
preparedness efforts by improving upon their roles in the retention, production, and 
motivational processes. The institutional approach to active shooter preparedness may 
need to be altered to incorporate the principles outlined in SCT and the training 
recommendations outlined by the DHS. From the faculty standpoint, theoretically, the 
results of this study may help faculty members reflect on their role in active shooter 
preparedness and may cause faculty to improve upon their attentional and motivational 
processes. Practically, the results of this study may reveal the need for administrators at 
IHLs to assess or reassess the organizational culture of preparedness at their institution, 
and the effectiveness of their active shooter training efforts. The results of this study may 
influence administrators to create a culture of preparedness at their institutions, if a 
culture of preparedness has not already been established. Results may also reveal the 
need for more operations-based training exercises to reinforce what is taught in 
discussion-based exercises. If this research finds that there is no link between faculty 
AST and active shooter preparedness, there is likely to be little or no change in how IHLs 
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prepare for or respond to active shooter threats and situations. There is also likely to be 
little or no change in how faculty view AST and view their active shooter preparedness.    
Purpose 
This study aimed to explore faculty members’ active shooter preparedness by 
examining the impact of active shooter incidents and AST on faculty members’ 
perceptions, behaviors, and environments. The main aspect of this study was to determine 
if faculty members believe they are prepared to engage in active shooter situations. This 
study aimed to describe the nature of faculty ASTs, to examine faculty members’ beliefs 
regarding organizational vulnerability, and to examine faculty members’ beliefs in their 
own ability to handle active shooter incidents. This research attempted to determine if 
there was a match between the AST recommendations and the elements of ASTs at IHLs. 
This study intended to examine the extent to which faculty members’ perceptions of their 
active shooter preparedness  is related to faculty members’ environmental factors, 
personal and cognitive factors, and behaviors. In addition, the results from this study will 
add to the existing literature pertaining to faculty active shooter preparedness. These 
results may also help institutions assess faculty members’ active shooter preparedness, 
and help institutions refine faculty active shooter preparation efforts.  
Research Questions 
This study aimed to answer the following questions: 
1. What is the nature of active shooter training at IHLs? 
2. To what extent do the reported elements of AST at IHLs align with the DOE’s 
recommendations for active shooter preparedness? 
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3. What are the beliefs among faculty regarding the personal and cognitive 
factors that contribute to active shooter preparedness? 
4. What precautionary measures do faculty take to demonstrate active shooter 
preparedness? 
Definition of Terms 
Active Shooter Preparedness 
The ability to prevent, identify, and respond effectively to active shooter situations on 
college campuses by confidently implementing the knowledge and skills that were 
acquired through engaging in AST (Action Guide for Emergency Management at 
Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Education, 2010; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The reciprocal interaction between personal 
and cognitive factors, behavioral factors, and environmental factors (Bandura, 1986), 
AST  
AST is based on the protocols and procedures for active shooters that are outlined in 
institutions’ emergency management plan. AST is provided periodically throughout the 
year, and it prepares faculty, staff, and students for engaging in active shooter situations 
(Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; 
U.S. Department of Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  
AST also prepares faculty members to properly handle active shooter threats (Glover, 
2016; Howard, 2015; Johnson et al., 2016; Zdziarski, 2016).  
Discussion-Based Training Exercises  
Training exercises which includes tabletop exercises, workshops, seminars, and 
games (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). During discussion-based training 
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exercises, crisis management plans, protocols, and policies are developed, refined, and 
discussed (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). During discussion-based 
training participants also discuss how they would respond to active shooter scenarios.     
Operations-Based Training Exercises 
Active shooter simulations which includes drills, functional exercises, and full-
scale exercises (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). During operations-based 
training exercises, participants practice responding to mock active shooter situations by 
implementing the protocols outlined in the institution’s crisis management plan (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013).  
Delimitations 
The purpose of this study was to examine faculty active shooter preparedness at 
IHLs. This research was limited to the responses of faculty members who were employed 
at IHLs within the United States because there was little research available regarding 
faculty active shooter preparedness. Faculty members that teach at online IHLs were 
excluded from this study because research indicated that it is the college campuses that 
are vulnerable to active shooter incidents (Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011; Wang & 
Hutchins, 2010). With regard to crisis preparedness, in prior research, faculty reported 
that they were not prepared for crisis situations (Bishop, 2013; Lott, 2012). When 
comparing faculty crisis preparedness to staff crisis preparedness, Liu et al. (2015) found 
that staff felt more prepared for crisis situations than faculty members. For these reasons, 
staff and students were excluded from the current research study. General crisis 
preparedness was also excluded from this research study because through the years 
general crisis preparedness at IHLs has already been extensively researched. The current 
 9 
research study did not intend to evaluate active shooter training components. The current 
research merely intended to determine the nature of active shooter preparation efforts at 
IHLs and to examine the relationship between AST and faculty members’ perceptions of 
their active shooter preparedness.  
Assumptions 
There are several assumptions associated with this research study. First and 
foremost, it was assumed that all the participants have had some exposure to active 
shooter incidents either through media, training, or personal experiences. Faculty 
exposure to active shooter incidents was captured by a questionnaire. It was also assumed 
that the participants of this study voluntarily participated and were honest/forthcoming 
regarding their responses to all questionnaire items. The instrument used in this study was 
only completed by faculty members from IHLs (inclusive of private and public colleges 
and universities as well as community colleges). In efforts to ensure that participants 
were at liberty to respond honestly, participants names and email addresses were not 
collected. Participants were assured that their identities would remain anonymous. 
Finally, it was assumed that all the participants had some awareness of their institution’s 
plans and procedures related to active shooters or had access to said material should they 
so choose to review it. 
Justification 
Crisis planning, management, and preparedness for active shooter situations falls 
under the umbrella of institutional crisis preparedness and is a relatively new area of 
research in higher education. There is currently a limited amount of research regarding 
faculty ASTs. Until the 21st century, active shooter incidents at IHLs were rarely 
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encountered and there was no need to prepare for these types of occurrences. During the 
21st century, active shooter incidents in educational settings became more common. As a 
result, more focus has been placed on ensuring that IHLs are prepared for these incidents 
(Blair & Scheweit, 2013; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). Higher education 
institutions are now required by federal law to have emergency management plans in 
place to address these potential threats to campus. Even so, institutions have the 
autonomy to decide the best way to prepare their campuses for crisis situations (Action 
Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; U.S. 
Department of Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Education, 2014).  
The goal of crisis planning, management, and preparedness research is to attempt 
to help keep college campuses as safe as possible, to ensure that campus personnel are 
equipped with the knowledge, skills, training, and resources needed to ensure their own 
safety and the safety of college students, and to ensure institutional compliance with 
campus safety legislation (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of 
Higher Education, 2010). The U.S. Department of Education (DOE) recommended that 
IHLs conduct trainings with faculty to help prevent active shooter incidents as well as to 
prepare faculty for the onset of active shooter incidents (Action Guide for Emergency 
Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Education, 
2010).  
Research conducted regarding faculty AST and faculty active shooter 
preparedness has the potential to help stakeholders better understand the active shooter 
preparation efforts at IHLs (Sullivan, 2012). Research conducted in this area can also 
help determine whether faculty are knowledgeable of their departmental and institutional 
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crisis management plans, cognizant of associated procedures, familiar with crisis 
management teams, and aware of reporting protocols for suspicious activity (Readiness 
and Emergency Management for Schools Technical Assistance Center, n.d.). 
Additionally, research on faculty active shooter preparedness reveals if institutions are 
regularly disseminating information regarding their crisis management plans as it is 
outlined in legislation, if faculty are regularly disseminating this information to students, 
and if periodic trainings including drills are being conducted by institutions. Active 
shooter preparedness research will aid in the evaluation of the effectiveness of ASTs, by 
identifying the extent to which active shooter trainings are preparing faculty members to 
deter or engage in active shooter situations. These findings may also aid institutions in 
improving their active shooter preparation efforts, and cause institutions to become more 
proactive and strategic in their crisis planning and preparation of faculty. 
Summary 
Crisis management at IHLs has evolved overtime due in part to the rise in active 
shooter incidents on college campuses. Research regarding active shooter preparedness 
generally suggests that IHLs are not fully compliant with campus safety legislation, that a 
culture of preparedness must be developed on every college campuses, and that faculty 
active shooter preparedness needs to be further cultivated. The literature lacks sufficient 
information pertaining to the effectiveness of AST and the preparation of faculty for 
active shooter situations. In seeking to increase understanding of faculty active shooter 
preparedness, Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) can serve as a theoretical 
foundation from which to examine faculty environments, personal and cognitive factors, 
and behaviors. 
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Over the past 50 plus years, IHLs have  dealt with a variety of third party assaults 
(Epstein, 2002; Fox & Savage, 2009). Active shooter incidents on college campuses are 
classified as third-party assaults (Epstein, 2002; Farahany, 2004; Fox & Savage, 2009). 
Researchers suggests that college campuses are areas of high criminal activity because of 
their openness to the public (Epstein, 2002; Farahany, 2004; Foster & Lipka, 2007; Fox 
& Savage, 2009; Lake, 2007; Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011). As a result, campus personnel 
and college students have an increased risk of being involved in a third-party assault 
incident while on campus. Incidents of third party assault at IHLs have resulted in a few 
landmark court cases that have clarified the duty of institutions to warn students of 
impending dangers and to protect students from present dangers (Bowden, 2007; Epstein, 
2002; Farahany, 2004; Lake, 2007).  
The Higher Education Opportunity Act indicated that IHLs have a responsibility 
to provide a safe environment and to protect the campus community (Bowden, 2007; 
Epstein, 2002; Farahany, 2004; U.S. Department of Education, 2010). Despite legislative 
and crisis management improvements, college campuses remain vulnerable to active 
shooter incidents (Booker, 2014; Fox & Savage, 2009; Mitroff et. al., 2006; Sullivan, 
2012; Wang & Hutchins, 2010). The campus population, location and size of campuses, 
campus design, and low police presence on college campuses contribute to the 
vulnerability of institutions to active shooters (Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011; Wang & 
Hutchins, 2010). 
As mentioned in chapter 1, active shooter situations are unpredictable incidents 
that normally end before law enforcement officers arrive (Booker, 2014; Doherty, 2016; 
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Moats et al., 2008; OPS Active Shooter Guide, n.d.; U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008; Wang & Hutchins, 2010). The average active shooter incident lasts about 
12 minutes (Doherty, 2016; OPS Active Shooter Guide, n.d.; U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008). Research indicated that active shooter incidents are now more 
common in educational settings than ever before (Blair & Scheweit, 2013; Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2016). Johnson et al. (2016) reported that the second most 
common place for active shooter incidents to occur is in educational settings. These 
findings highlight the need for active shooter preparedness at IHLs.  
Campus Safety and Security Legislation 
A major turning point in campus safety and security legislation occurred after the 
1986 rape and murder of Jeanne Clery (Janosik & Gregory, 2003). On the night of the 
incident, a male student entered Clery’s dorm room at Lehigh University while she was 
sleeping. The male student sexually assaulted and killed Clery while she was on campus 
(“Clery Center for Campus Security”, 2018). Following the incident, Jeanne Clery’s 
parents filed a law suit against Lehigh University claiming that the institution was 
negligent because the institution failed to protect their daughter from foreseeable danger 
(“Clery Center for Campus Security”, 2018; Whissemore, 2015). At the time of this 
incident IHLs were not mandated by law to provide students with warnings regarding 
criminal activity on or near campus.  
After their daughter’s murder, the Clerys’ recognized the need for improved 
legislation regarding campus security and improved security measures on college 
campuses (“Clery Center for Campus Security”, 2018; Whissemore, 2015). As a result of 
this need, the Clerys began lobbying for reform in campus safety and security legislation 
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on Capitol Hill (“Clery Center for Campus Security”, 2018). Congress enacted the Clery 
Act in response to the Clerys’ efforts. The Clery Act applies to both private and public 
IHLs and it mandates institutions to provide timely warnings to students and employees 
about any crime posing a threat to campus, disclose institutional security policies, and 
report crime statistics (Foster & Lipka, 2007; Janosik & Gregory, 2003; Whissemore, 
2015).  
In 1990, President George Bush, Sr. signed the act into law and the Clery Act was 
codified as an amendment to the Higher Education Act of 1965 (Janosik & Gregory, 
2003; Whissemore, 2015). As well, the Campus Security Act of 1990 required IHLs to 
have their own crisis or emergency response plans (Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011; U.S. 
Department of Education, 2014). This act also required institutions to promptly disclose 
threats to the campus community and all personnel. Research indicated that two decades 
later, many IHLs were still not fully compliant with the requirements of this act (Booker, 
2014; Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011; Sullivan, 2012; Wang & Hutchins, 2010; Zdziarski, 
2001).  
The 2007 Virginia Tech active shooter incident placed national spotlight back on 
college campus security and safety. The incident led to another major turning point in 
campus safety and security because it forced IHLs across the nation to place more focus 
on campus safety and active shooter preparedness. The DOE launched an investigation of 
Virginia Tech after the shootings occurred and found that the institution was indeed 
negligent in the way that they handled the active shooter incident (Layton, 2014).  
As a result, the Higher Education Act of 2008 mandated that IHLs have emergency 
responses and evacuation procedures; annually disclose these procedures to faculty, staff 
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and students; annually test emergency response and evacuation procedures; and 
immediately notify members of the campus community of threatening activity (Fox & 
Savage, 2009; U.S. Department of Education, 2010). It also recommended that IHLs 
provide training to personnel and students.  
Legislation clearly outlines the necessary components of effective crisis 
management planning for IHLs (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). Many of the best 
crisis management practices identified in the literature have been mandated by the 
Campus Security Act of 1990 and by the Higher Education Act of 2008. The 2008 Higher 
Education Act allocated grant monies to IHLs to help relieve some of the financial 
burden associated with crisis management, to aid institutions in complying with federal 
legislation, and to help institutions improve campus safety. However, it is up to 
institutions to implement best practices and adequately prepare their campus communities 
for crisis situations.  
Institutional Crisis Management 
Effective crisis management is an ongoing process (Zdziarski, 2016). Institutions 
can either be reactive or proactive in their crisis planning and preparation (Booker, 2014; 
Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; Mitroff, Diamond, & Alpaslan, 2006; Wang & Hutchins, 
2010). Prior to the Virginia Tech incident, active shooter incidents were not regularly 
encountered on college campuses (Fox & Savage, 2009; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003). The 
active shooter incident at Virginia Tech highlighted the inadequacy of the reactive 
approach to crisis management that is employed at most IHLs. Institutions that are 
reactive in their crisis planning are open to major calamity in the event of an active 
shooter situation because they are prepared only for normally encountered incidents, such 
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as fires, suicides, student deaths, sexual assaults, lawsuits, campus disturbances, and 
crimes (Booker, 2014; Mitroff et. al., 2006; Wang & Hutchins, 2010; Zdziarski, 2001). 
To combat this, proactive preparation for active shooter incidents must be employed in 
efforts to minimize casualties, minimize loss, and to keep the college campus community 
safe (Booker, 2014; Fox & Savage, 2009; Wang & Hutchins, 2010; Moats et al., 2008). 
Institutions that are proactive in their crisis planning develop and maintain effective crisis 
management plans and review them regularly (Booker, 2014; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; 
Mitroff et. al., 2006).  
Institutional crisis management teams are necessary to ensure that effective crisis 
management planning and preparation is occurring on college campuses (Booker, 2014; 
Fox & Savage, 2009; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008; Sullivan, 
2012; Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011; Wang & Hutchins, 2010; Waugh & Streib, 2006). 
Research indicated that the crisis management teams should have representatives from all 
operational areas of the institution. Such teams are responsible for ensuring that crisis 
plans are in place, implemented, and practiced periodically. These teams are also 
responsible for responding to threats and actual crisis situations as well as disseminating 
crisis prevention and containment protocols and procedures to faculty, staff and students. 
For crisis plans to be effective, the campus community should be informed, educated, and 
trained (Booker, 2014; Fox & Savage, 2009; Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; Mitroff & 
Alpaslan, 2003; Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008; Sullivan, 2012; Sulkowski & Lazarus, 
2011; Wang & Hutchins, 2010; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Zdziarski, 2016).  
Crisis management planning is most effective when it is a proactive process, 
which enables institutions to clearly identify procedures that should be followed before, 
 17 
during, and after a crisis (Booker, 2014; Fox & Savage, 2009; Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; 
Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; Mitroff et. al., 2006; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Wooten & James, 
2008). Among IHLs, crisis management is also referred to as emergency management. In 
recent years, institutions have worked to improve their crisis management policies and 
procedures to better prepare for active shooter situations (Campo-Flores et al., 2015; Fox 
& Savage, 2009; Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008; Wang & Hutchins, 2010). Having an 
effective crisis management plan that includes active shooter preparedness efforts enables 
institutions to be better prepared to deter or manage active shooter incidents. 
The DOE indicated that there are four phases of emergency management on 
which institutions should base their crisis management plans. These phases are 
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery (Action Guide for Emergency 
Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010). The DHS has indicated that there 
are five similar phases of emergency management: prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery (Guide for developing high quality emergency operations plans 
for institutions of higher education, 2013). Regardless of the number of steps included, 
the most effective crisis management plans are extensively detailed and outline steps for 
managing a wide variety of crisis situations (Booker, 2014; Fox & Savage, 2009; 
Howard, 2015; Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; Mitroff et. al., 2006; 
Wang & Hutchins, 2010; Zdziarski, 2016). These plans list action steps, tactics to 
employ, and the means to deploy personnel, resources, and equipment.  
Institutional Crisis Management Research and AST 
The literature revealed that faculty active shooter preparedness which includes 
AST has primarily been examined in conjunction with institutional crisis management 
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(Akers, 2007; Campo-Flores et al., 2015; Fox & Savage, 2009; Lott, 2012; Rasmussen & 
Johnson, 2008; Sullivan, 2012; Sullivan & Perry, 2014; Wang & Hutchins, 2010). The 
bulk of the research that is available primarily focuses on crisis management and 
organizational preparedness. Throughout the literature, the same researchers are 
consistently cited (Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; Mitroff et. al., 2006; Rasmussen & 
Johnson, 2008; Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011; Sullivan, 2012; Snyder, 2014; Wang & 
Hutchins, 2010; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Zdziarski, 2001, 2016). The tipping point in 
higher education crisis management research occurred in 2001 when Eugene Zdziarski 
examined the status of crisis management from the perspective of student affairs 
administrators. Zdziarski examined the types of crises that four-year institutions were 
prepared for, the stages of crises institutions prepared for, the systems that were put in 
place to address crisis situations, and the level of stakeholder involvement in institutional 
crisis preparedness (Zdziarski, 2001).  
One hundred forty-six institutions were represented in Zdziarski’s study. Through 
his research, Zdziarski found that although administrators perceived their institutions as 
generally prepared to respond to a variety of crisis situations, institutional crisis 
management was approached from a reactive standpoint (2001). His research revealed 
that institutions placed less emphasis on the pre-crisis phase of crisis management and 
more emphasis on the actual crisis and the post-crisis phase of crisis management. 
Zdziarski also found that a wide range of stakeholders were involved in institutional 
crisis planning and response efforts (2001). Zdziarski’s study did not include specific 
active shooter preparation efforts, however, his study revealed that with regard to 
training, crisis simulations and tabletop exercises were seldom conducted. 
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In 2007, Akers also examined the status of crisis management in higher education 
by surveying and interviewing 51 student affairs personnel. Fifty-one IHLs were 
represented in this study. Akers found that there were some discrepancies between the 
perceptions of crises management held by administrators and the perceptions held by 
student affairs personnel (Akers, 2007). He identified these discrepancies through 
analyzing the crisis response strategies, policies, and programs that were in place at each 
institution, and compared that information to the respondents’ survey and interview 
responses. The participating institutions all reported having active crisis response teams 
that developed crisis response protocols for the institutions.  
Akers found that training type, training content, training evaluation methods, and 
frequency of trainings varied across institutions and varied within institutions by 
department (2007). Generally, crisis training included either engaging participants in case 
study discussions, drills, or tabletop exercises (Akers, 2007). Tabletop training exercises 
were conducted with and without external partners. Akers found that crisis management 
plans, emergency notifications, immediate response procedures, and crisis follow-up 
protocols were covered during training sessions. Student affairs personnel reported being 
responsible for providing training to faculty members. The respondents in Akers study 
stated that crisis training lacked sufficient formalized training processes and needed to be 
improved in many areas (Akers, 2007).  
In 2008, the first Higher Education Emergency Management Survey was 
administered to IHLs. The survey was developed and administered to gather data 
regarding institutional crisis management, and to identify crisis management trends at 
IHLs (Sullivan, 2012; Sullivan & Perry, 2014). The Higher Education Emergency 
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Management Survey was administered again in 2011 and in 2014. The survey was 
predominantly completed by emergency management personnel at IHLs. Through the 
years, roughly 100 to 150 public and private institutions have been represented in this 
research study. The 2008 survey results were used as the baseline data for future research. 
The 2008 version of the survey did not include any questions regarding crisis training and 
evaluation, but the 2011 and 2014 versions of the survey did (Sullivan, 2012; Sullivan & 
Perry, 2014).  
Although AST was not specifically mentioned in the 2011 or 2014 surveys, 
significant information regarding crisis training and training exercises was gathered. The 
2011 survey results indicated that 74% of participating institutions reported conducting 
some form of crisis training exercise in 2010 (Sullivan, 2012). The 2014 survey results 
showed a 5% increase in the number of crisis training sessions that were being conducted 
at institutions (Sullivan & Perry, 2014). In 2014, participants indicated that tabletop 
training exercises were the most common method of crisis training being conducted at 
institutions (Sullivan & Perry, 2014).  
In 2012, Mary Lott surveyed faculty, staff, students, and crisis management team 
members from five universities to examine university crisis management. In Lott’s 
analysis, she compared the team members’ responses to the responses of the faculty, 
staff, and students (2012). There were 52 participants in this research study. Lott found 
that the faculty, staff, and students that participated in her study all reported that they felt 
they were not familiar with the procedures associated with handling crisis situations. 
Although the participants reported that their institutions conducted drills; faculty, staff, 
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and students reported that if a crisis incident occurred on their campus, they would not be 
prepared to respond to it (Lott, 2012). 
In 2016, the National Higher Education Emergency Program Management 
Programs Needs Assessment was conducted to determine the status of emergency 
management at IHLs across the nation. About 600 participants from institutions in 45 
states completed this assessment survey. Active shooters were mentioned in this 
assessment, but AST was not examined. Sixty-nine percent of the respondents reported 
that their campuses provided crisis training to faculty and staff, and 32% of the 
respondents reported that training needed to be improved (The National Center for 
Campus Public Safety, 2016). The results from the 2016 assessment also revealed that 
tabletop training exercises were the most commonly employed method of crisis training 
(The National Center for Campus Public Safety, 2016). The findings from the national 
assessment are consistent with prior research. The increase in the use of tabletop trainings 
through the years is a major improvement from Zdziarski’s findings in 2001.  
Research has consistently noted that recent crisis incidents which include campus 
shootings have caused a major shift in institutional crisis preparedness and management 
(Akers, 2007; Campo-Flores et al., 2015; Fox & Savage, 2009; Lott, 2012; Rasmussen & 
Johnson, 2008; Sullivan, 2012; Sullivan & Perry, 2014; The National Center for Campus 
Public Safety, 2016; Wang & Hutchins, 2010). As of 2014, IHLs were still not using the 
most recent training recommendations, which is the Department of Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program model for crisis training (Sullivan, 2012; Sullivan & 
Perry, 2014). Data from the 2014 survey revealed that a large portion of institutions were 
still not compliant with the Higher Education Opportunity Act (Sullivan & Perry, 2014). 
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During the 2016 assessment, participants reported that the belief on their campus was that 
a major crisis situation would not happen on their campus (The National Center for 
Campus Public Safety, 2016). These findings are consistent with research that suggested 
that IHLs are reactive in their crisis preparedness efforts (Booker, 2014; Mitroff & 
Alpaslan, 2003; Mitroff et. al., 2006; The National Center for Campus Public Safety, 
2016; Wang & Hutchins, 2010; Zdziarski, 2001).  
The findings from the 2011 and 2014 Higher Education Emergency Management 
survey were consistent with the research findings of Akers. Like Aker’s research, the 
Higher Education Emergency Management survey revealed that crisis management 
policies and protocols varied across institutions (Akers, 2007; Lott, 2012; Sullivan, 2012; 
Sullivan & Perry, 2014). The findings indicated that overall the status of crisis 
preparation and management in higher education has improved. However, more 
improvements are needed, especially in the area of crisis training (Akers, 2007; Lott, 
2012; Sullivan, 2012; Sullivan & Perry, 2014; The National Center for Campus Public 
Safety, 2016; Zdziarski, 2001). 
Theoretical Framework 
The nature of AST, elements of AST, faculty beliefs regarding institutional 
vulnerability, and faculty beliefs regarding their active shooter preparedness will be 
examined through the lens of Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory (SCT). In 1986, SCT 
emerged as an avenue to explain human behavior. This theory provides the foundation for 
examining faculty active shooter preparedness. SCT contends that people are not 
completely driven by internal forces neither are they controlled and shaped by external 
forces (Bandura, 1986). Through SCT, Bandura explained human behavior as the 
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reciprocal interaction between cognitive and personal factors, the environment, and 
behaviors. The three factors in this interaction are determinants of each other. Bandura 
refers to this interaction as triadic reciprocal determinism (1986). He noted that the 
reciprocality of the interaction does not mean that the factors influence each other with 
the same strength or in the same direction. The influence of each factor on the other 
factors varies depending on circumstances, activities, and individuals. With this 
framework in mind, the main aspect of this research study was to describe faculty active 
shooter preparedness by examining faculty members’ personal and cognitive factors, 
environmental factors, and behavioral factors. Figure 1 illustrates this interaction. 
Figure 1. Active Shooter Preparedness Situated in Reciprocal Determinism 
 
Within this framework, faculty active shooter preparedness is defined as the reciprocal 
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factors (Bandura, 1986). Personal and cognitive factors consist of faculty beliefs 
regarding organizational vulnerability, personal safety, forethought, AST, and self-
efficacy. Environmental factors consist of the nature of AST or the lack thereof, and the 
culture of preparedness or the lack thereof. Finally, behavioral factors consist of 
precautionary measures and the intent to transfer or not transfer what is learned during 
AST. The reciprocal interaction between these three factors describe faculty active 
shooter preparedness. 
Observational Learning 
In Social Foundations of Thoughts and Action, Bandura noted that people can 
learn vicariously through observing other people’s behaviors and the consequences 
associated with said behaviors. Based on this principle, SCT implies that active shooter 
preparedness can be achieved without being directly involved in an actual active shooter 
incident (Ellies, 2015; Johnson et al., 2016; Pitrowski, 2014; Snyder, 2014; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Faculty members can learn how to respond to, 
deter, and/or engage in active shooter situations through observing the behaviors of 
others who have been involved in such incidents. ASTs and media coverage of active 
shooter incidents on college campuses serve as vicarious learning experiences for faculty 
members. Learning through observation allows faculty to improve their skills and deepen 
their knowledge based on the information conveyed and behaviors modeled by others. 
Observations aid faculty members in developing new rules of behavior because they 
serve as a guide for future actions (Bandura, 1986).  
According to Bandura, affective learning can also occur through vicarious 
experiences (Bandura, 1986). Faculty members can develop strong emotional reactions 
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toward active shooter threats and incidents without ever being directly involved in them 
(Bandura, 1986). Fear associated with the possibility of encountering an active shooter on 
campus can arise in faculty because of exposure to the casualties and devastation that has 
been caused by active shooters on other campuses.   
During ASTs, desired survival behaviors are modeled. Modeling is a forceful 
means to transfer thoughts, values, and behaviors by imparting new conceptual 
understandings onto observers (Bandura, 1986). Through observing the performance of 
others, people can obtain cognitive skills and perform new patterns of behavior (Bandura, 
1986). Media coverage, tabletop exercises, games, functional exercises, and full-scale 
exercises provide opportunities for faculty members to observe other people’s behaviors 
in relation to active shooters (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of 
Higher Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). The modeling 
that occurs in AST situations teach faculty new skills and provides faculty with rules for 
putting the new skills into practice. Extending Bandura’s notion that individuals need 
repeated exposures to the target behavior, faculty members must have repeated exposure 
to behaviors that demonstrate how to avert active shooter situations (Bandura, 1986). 
Faculty should receive a variety of AST opportunities (Action Guide for Emergency 
Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008, 2013). The overarching goal of training is to produce new behavior thus, 
the goal for AST is to prepare individuals to successfully deter or engage in active 
shooter situations.  
There are four processes that influence observational learning. These processes 
are attentional processes, retention processes, production processes, and motivational 
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processes (Bandura, 1986). With regard to attentional processes, Bandura noted that for 
people to learn through observation, they must “attend to and accurately perceive the 
relevant aspects of modeled activities” (1986, p. 51). With regards to faculty active 
shooter preparedness, this means faculty must want to pay attention to ASTs and want to 
accurately perceive the information that is conveyed during the trainings to learn from the 
training exercises. Personal expectations govern what people decide to give their 
attention to. People generally give their attention to learning from situations that they 
believe are similar to situations that they will have to manage in the future (Bandura, 
1986). Faculty who hold the expectation that they will one day be involved in a similar 
task as the one being observed pay greater attention and learn more from the training 
situations. Faculty who consider the modeled behaviors as irrelevant learn less. The 
anticipated benefits of employing modeled behaviors and skills serve as incentives to 
encourage people to pay greater attention to the modeled behaviors. Staying alive and 
saving others’ lives are the major benefits of demonstrating active shooter preparedness 
(Blair & Schweit, 2013; Morris, 2014). These benefits serve as incentives for faculty 
members to be actively engaged during active shooter trainings.  
Retention processes are the second processes that influence observational 
learning. Faculty must be able to retain what they have learned through observational 
learning experiences, so that they can be influenced by it (Bandura, 1986). According to 
Bandura, rehearsal improves retention, finding that people who practice modeled 
behaviors and people who cognitively rehearse are more likely to retain what they have 
seen or learned than those who do not (Bandura, 1986). Operations-based AST exercises 
provide faculty members with the opportunity to rehearse their responses to active 
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shooter situations. Rehearsing decision-making skills and rehearsing procedures for 
dealing with active shooter situations have the potential to help faculty to retain the 
knowledge, understandings, and new behaviors that they obtained from the discussion-
based training exercises (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of 
Higher Education, 2010; Johnson et al., 2016; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2013).  
The third type of processes that influence observational learning are the 
production processes. These processes deal with performance and feedback (Bandura, 
1986). Observational learning absent of practice will not result in perfect performance 
because there may be a mismatch between the learners’ conceptions of the observed 
behaviors and the actions that are required to execute the observed behaviors (Bandura, 
1986). During the production process, faculty translate their understandings into practice.  
Practice alone is not enough to ensure perfect performance because without proper 
feedback, the learners could be practicing incorrectly under the personal assumption that 
they are practicing the actions correctly (Bandura, 1986). Operations-based training 
exercises aid trainers and administrators in identifying what faculty have partially learned 
or missed during the discussion-based trainings. Practicing active shooter survival tactics 
in conjunction with providing faculty with corrective feedback will help faculty develop a 
survival mindset, build self-efficacy, and heightens attentional processes (Blair & 
Schweit, 2013; Ellies, 2015; Johnson et al., 2016; Morris, 2014; Pitrowski, 2014; Snyder, 
2014; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The absence of practice combined 
with corrective feedback after learning in discussion-based AST, could leave faculty 
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unprepared to perform the learned tactics in the event of an actual active shooter 
situation.  
Motivational processes are the final processes that influence observational 
learning. Motivational processes account for the discrepancies between what is learned 
and what is performed. There is a tendency not to perform behaviors that lack functional 
value. Directly experienced consequences and observed outcomes can lead to changes in 
human behavior (Bandura, 1986). Knowledge can be gained vicariously about the 
benefits and risks associated with different actions through observing the outcomes of 
others who employ similar actions or engage in similar situations (Bandura, 1986). This 
means that faculty have the capability to learn and benefit from the experiences of others 
who have engaged in active shooter situations or trainings.  
Forethought 
Bandura (1986) pointed out that forethought regulates most of human behavior. 
Forethought is the careful consideration of the necessary actions that will be required in 
future situations. It serves as a guide for actions and a mechanism for personal motivation 
(Bandura, 1986). Through forethought people anticipate the consequences or rewards that 
are likely to be associated with certain actions and they adjust their behaviors according 
to whichever outcomes they find favorable (Bandura, 1986). Bandura pointed out that 
although future events do not serve as determinants of behavior, personal actions are 
causally impacted by the cognitive representations of future events (1986). These 
representations can have a strong impact on a person’s action. With regard to active 
shooter incidents at IHLs, it is important for faculty to carefully consider the possibility 
of being involved in an active shooter situation so that they may demonstrate the positive 
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behaviors that are associated with active shooter preparedness (Johnson et al., 2016; 
Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; Howard, 2015; Zdziarski, 2016).  
Bandura stated that, “images of desirable future events tend to foster the behavior 
most likely to bring about their realization. By representing foreseeable outcomes 
symbolically, people can convert future consequences into current motivators and 
regulators of foresightful behavior” (Bandura, 1986, p. 19). Self-regulating mechanisms 
help translate forethought into action (Bandura, 1986). Media coverage of active shooter 
incidents on college campuses and images that are displayed during ASTs serve as the 
mediums to represent active shooter incidents and outcomes to faculty members. These 
images help faculty develop mental images that aid in their forethought, decision making, 
and choice of behaviors.  
Outcome Expectations 
People tend to adjust their actions to achieve the outcomes they desire. They also 
judge the likelihood of the consequences and rewards that behaviors will produce. This is 
known as outcome expectation (Bandura, 1986). Faculty may carry out actions expecting 
to either prevent future trouble or obtain future benefits. The presence of positive 
outcomes increases the likelihood that acquired knowledge is performed when needed 
(Bandura, 1986). When observers view the behaviors of the model being rewarded, the 
tendency of the observers to behave in a similar fashion increase (Bandura, 1986). When 
observers view the behavior of the model being punished, the tendency of the observers 
to behave in a similar fashion decreases (Bandura, 1986). Observed outcomes can 
influence the observers’ level of motivation (Bandura,1986). Seeing others survive active 
shooter situations motivates observers to engage in the actions that result in survival. 
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Seeing others succeed in responding to simulated active shooter incidents also motivates 
observers to engage in actions that result in survival. On the contrary, seeing fatalities 
associated with active shooter situations deters observers from repeating behaviors that 
decrease the chances of survival. According to Bandura, some actions are carried out 
without the presence of immediate external punishments or rewards (1986). Bandura 
noted that if there is no immediate reward or punishment associated with certain 
behaviors, people motivate themselves and create their own guides for their actions 
(1986).  
Personal Effort 
Personal effort is determined by the effects that people believe their actions will 
have on a situation. People adjust the amount of effort they exert in any given situation 
based on the effect they expect their actions to have, because of this, beliefs serve as a 
predictor of behavior (Bandura, 1986). Faculty beliefs regarding active shooter threats 
and incidents will influence their willingness to actively participate in ASTs, and their 
willingness to employ behaviors that indicate preparedness. Faculty beliefs regarding the 
impact of their ability to affect an active shooter situation will also influence their 
willingness to employ preventative and deterring behaviors. Bandura stated,  
To function effectively, people must anticipate the probable effects of different 
incidents and courses of action and regulate their behavior accordingly. Without 
anticipatory capacities, they would be forced to act blindly in ways that often 
prove to be fruitless, if not injurious. (1986, p. 182) 
Based on Bandura’s statement, if faculty members maintain the attitude that active 
shooter situations will never happen on their campus, faculty members will exert limited 
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amounts of effort regarding preparing for active shooter incidents. Since people adjust 
their behaviors to match the outcomes they expect, faculty members who maintain this 
attitude may fail to learn from active shooter trainings and may fail to demonstrate active 
shooter preparedness. There may be fatal outcomes associated with failing to prepare to 
engage in active shooter situations (Action Guide for Emergency Management at 
Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; Johnson et al., 2016; Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; 
Howard, 2015; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, 2013 Zdziarski, 2016). On 
the contrary, if faculty members anticipate that active shooter situations could occur on 
their campuses, faculty members will be more likely to exert maximum effort regarding 
preparedness efforts. Faculty members would also be more likely to demonstrate 
behaviors that could prevent active shooter situations from occurring or minimize the 
severity of active shooter situations.  
Self-Efficacy 
  Internal standards and personal evaluations of one’s own behavior are vehicles 
through which people regulate their behavior. Bandura (1986) stated that, “people often 
do not behave optimally even though they know full well what to do. This is because 
self-referent thought mediates the relationship between knowledge and action” (Bandura, 
1986, p. 391). People choose behaviors and motivate themselves to engage in certain 
behaviors based on their judgment of their own capabilities. This is known as self-
efficacy. Self-efficacy is linked to performance. “Perceived self-efficacy is defined as 
people’s judgments of their capabilities to organize and execute courses of action 
required to attain designated types of performances” (Bandura, 1986, p. 391). The 
concept of self-efficacy suggests that perceived self-efficacy influences persistence, 
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effort, behavioral settings and choice of activities (Bandura, 1977; Bandura 1986). 
Faculty members’ perceptions of their self-efficacy can affect their choice of behaviors 
before, during, and after active shooter situations. These self-perceptions may also 
influence the extent to which faculty members willingly and actively engage in AST.  
Perceptions of self-efficacy do not solely determine people’s actions. To behave 
proficiently faculty members must possess the necessary skills, believe that they can 
carry out whatever actions are required, and carry out either precautionary or survival 
actions (Bandura, 1986). Bandura found that the stronger an individual’s perceived self-
efficacy, the more determined, effective, diligent, and successful the individual will be 
unless their beliefs are miscalibrated (Bandura, 1977; Bandura, 1986). A false sense of 
preparedness could cause faculty members’ self-efficacy to be miscalibrated (Bandura, 
1986).  
Furthermore, successes and failures influence self-efficacy. Once self-efficacy is 
developed and elevated through successful experiences, self-efficacy can be generalized 
to other experiences. A strong level of self-efficacy is minimally affected by sporadic 
failures (Bandura, 1986). Vicarious experiences and verbal persuasion also influence 
people’s self-efficacy (Bandura 1986). With regard to active shooter preparation, faculty 
can enhance their self-efficacy by engaging in ASTs. These trainings provide 
opportunities for faculty to participate in vicarious learning experiences, practice mastery 
of skills and behaviors, receive verbal persuasion, and view the physiological reactions of 
others (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 
2010; Johnson et al., 2016; Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; Howard, 2015; U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008, 2013; Zdziarski, 2016). The desired outcome of AST is active 
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shooter preparedness (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher 
Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, 2013). Engaging in AST 
experiences provide opportunities for faculty members to develop the outcome 
expectancy beliefs that encourage the successful execution of the desired behaviors in the 
event of an active shooter situation. 
Culture of Preparedness  
To prepare for active shooter incidents, institutions must create a culture of 
preparedness on their campuses (Johnson et al., 2016; Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; Howard, 
2015; Zdziarski, 2016). Research indicated that in order for institutions to create a culture 
of preparedness and be well prepared for active shooter incidents, institutions must have 
comprehensive emergency management plans; must conduct periodic risk assessments; 
must develop strong partnerships with community stakeholders; must practice executing 
their emergency management plans; must regularly conduct drills; must post procedures 
and evacuation plans; must monitor the campus using surveillance cameras and security; 
and must provide active shooter response training to all students, faculty, and staff 
(Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; 
Allen & Lengfellner, 2016; Doherty, 2016; Guide for Developing High Quality 
Emergency Operations Plans for Institutions of Higher Education, 2013; Jenkins & 
Goodman, 2015; Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; Howard, 2015; Morris, 2014;  Zdziarski, 
2016). By extending SCT to this idea, creating and maintaining a culture of preparedness 
on college campuses enhances the four processes that influence observational learning 
(Bandura, 1986). Creating and maintaining a culture of preparedness may also help to 
make active shooter preparation efforts relevant faculty.  
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Crisis Preparedness Research 
In 2013, Bishop surveyed faculty from four institutions to identify their levels of 
crisis preparedness and perceptions of risks. Sixty-three faculty members participated in 
Bishop’s study (Bishop, 2013). Much like in Lott’s study (2012), faculty perceived 
themselves as not being prepared to engage in crisis situations. These findings confirm 
Bandura’s assertion that exposure and practice alone do not result in mastery or improved 
self-efficacy (1986). By viewing these findings through the lens of SCT, one could 
conclude that if the desired outcome of preparedness was not achieved, the trainings and 
drills may be ineffective. Bishop’s findings also revealed that faculty held a general 
perspective that emergency events were unlikely to occur on their campuses (Bishop, 
2013). Based on SCT, these perspectives may negatively affect the amount of effort that 
faculty put into engaging in training and in demonstrating preparedness. 
In 2015, Liu, Blankson and Brooks conducted a research study to identify the 
group differences in university employee’s beliefs about crisis preparedness and active 
shooter risks. They surveyed full time faculty and staff from a medium-sized 
comprehensive university. One hundred and eleven university employees participated in 
the research study. The results of Liu et al.’s (2015) study were consistent with the 
findings of Bishop (2013) and Lott (2012) in that faculty were not knowledgeable of 
appropriate crisis responses and were not prepared to engage in a variety of crisis 
situations. In contrast, staff members demonstrated higher levels of crisis preparedness 
and self-efficacy than faculty members (Liu, Blankson and Brooks, 2015). Overall, 
women demonstrated higher levels of crisis preparedness than men. Overall results from 
this study indicated that crisis response training and communication were lacking at the 
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participating institution (Liu et al., 2015). Although the findings of Liu et al. cannot be 
generalized to the larger institutional faculty population, these findings are consistent 
with the prior research that indicated that crisis training at IHLs is either lacking 
altogether or lacking effectiveness (Akers, 2007; Liu et al., 2015; Lott, 2012; Myers, 
2016; Sullivan, 2012; Sullivan & Perry, 2014; Zdziarski, 2001). 
Active Shooter Training 
Effective training is a key component of organizational preparedness (Booker, 
2014; Fox & Savage, 2009; Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; 
Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008; Sullivan, 2012; Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011; Wang & 
Hutchins, 2010; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Zdziarski, 2016). Training is one of the most 
important components of active shooter preparedness. Effective training helps to 
facilitate a culture of preparedness on college campuses. Training provides opportunities 
for observational learning, practice, and corrective feedback to occur. Although it is 
impossible to prepare for every type of active shooter situation, research indicated that 
students, faculty, and staff must be trained on how to properly implement the institution’s 
emergency management plan in the event of an active shooter situation (Action Guide for 
Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; Allen & Lengfellner, 
2016; Doherty, 2016; Guide for Developing High Quality Emergency Operations Plans 
for Institutions of Higher Education, 2013; Jenkins & Goodman, 2015; Kapucu & Khosa, 
2013; Howard, 2015; Morris, 2014;  Zdziarski, 2016). Glover suggested that campus 
personnel and students should be educated on the importance of promptly reporting 
threats and incidents to the proper campus authorities (2016). Zdziarski (2016) noted that 
IHLs must encourage and support faculty members who identify and report potential 
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threats to campus safety. Institutions must also promptly respond to potential threats to 
campus in order to maintain safety (Glover, 2016; Zdziarski, 2016).   
According to Howard (2015) and Johnson et al. (2016), faculty training regarding 
how to respond to and assist active shooter responders should occur. The authors further 
contend that this training should occur on campus regularly, so that everyone is made 
aware of their roles and responsibilities during active shooter threats and incidents. In 
SCT, Bandura suggested that rehearsal helps to improve retention, so conducting regular 
ASTs could enhance retention process (1986).  
Survival 
Participating in AST helps participants develop a survival mindset (Ellies, 2015; 
Johnson et al., 2016; Pitrowski, 2014; Snyder, 2014; U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008). Failure to be prepared mentally to engage in an active shooter situation 
can result in panic and panic during an active shooter situation will lead to more 
casualties (Johnson et al., 2016). By engaging in AST, faculty members can gain a better 
understanding of basic survival tactics. During ASTs, participants learn tactics associated 
with “avoid, deny, defend” (Johnson et al., 2016) and “run, hide, fight” (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 2013). These tactics may help faculty members think quickly and 
clearly during active shooter situations (Glover, 2016; Howard, 2015; Johnson et al., 
2016). Glover (2016) noted that participating in active shooter drills instill and reinforce 
precautionary behaviors into the participants, and when applied, these tactics can save 
lives (2016). SCT suggests that training that includes practice and corrective feedback 
yields the best results (Bandura, 1986). 
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Types of Active Shooter Training 
The Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher 
Education was created by the DOE to assist institutions with emergency planning and 
management. The action guide also suggested that ASTs be conducted periodically on 
college campuses (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher 
Education, 2010). The action guide recommended that ASTs include community 
partners, first responders, and any other key stakeholders. The training guide also 
recommended that a full range of training should be used to effectively prepare 
personnel, staff, and all other stakeholders for active shooter incidents. The DHS 
indicated that individuals must be prepared physically and mentally to engage in active 
shooter situations because of the nature of these incidents (Readiness and Emergency 
Management for Schools Technical Assistance Center, n.d.; U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008).  
The DHS also indicated that conducting mock AST exercises is the best way to 
prepare people for being involved in an actual active shooter situation. Mock exercises 
allow for observational learning experiences that can include practice and corrective 
feedback. SCT suggests that practice with corrective feedback increases the likelihood 
that the learner performs and builds the learner’s self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986). To 
improve the likelihood of surviving an active shooter situation, individuals must be able 
to recognize potential threats, employ a survival mindset, recognize the sound of 
gunshots, react quickly either through hiding or evacuating, call 911, and cooperate with 
law enforcement (Ellies, 2015; Johnson et al., 2016; Pitrowski, 2014; Snyder, 2014; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  
 38 
In 2010, the DOE outlined five types of training exercises that should be 
conducted at IHLs. These exercises include orientation meetings, tabletop exercises, 
drills, functional exercises, and full-scale exercises (Action Guide for Emergency 
Management at Institutions of Higher Education). In contrast, the DHS outlined seven 
types of training exercises that should be conducted to facilitate crisis preparedness. 
These exercises include seminars, workshops, tabletop exercises, games, drills, functional 
exercises, and full-scale exercises (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). The 
DHS recommended that organizations use a progressive approach to training, where each 
training session or exercise builds on previous training exercises (2013).   
According to the DHS, seminars, workshops, tabletop exercises, and games have 
been categorized as discussion-based training exercises (2013). In contrast, drills, 
functional exercises, and full-scale exercises have been categorized as operations-based 
exercises (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). The seminars recommended by 
the DHS serve the same purpose as the orientation meetings recommended by the DOE. 
During both seminars and orientation meetings, the institution’s emergency management 
plan is introduced and shared with key stakeholders (Action Guide for Emergency 
Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013). Workshops serve as a means for participants to engage in the emergency 
management planning process and provide participants the opportunity to help create, 
review or revise emergency plans, and standard operating procedures (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 2013).  
Although the DHS concluded that operations-based exercises are the best way to 
prepare people for active shooter situations, as of 2016, tabletop exercises were the most 
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commonly used method of crisis training (The National Center for Campus Public Safety, 
2016; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). During tabletop exercises, 
personnel and key officials discuss active shooter scenarios and discuss how the 
individual departments and campus community will respond to these scenarios (Action 
Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013).  
According to DHS, participating in active shooter preparation games allow 
participants to practice decision-making skills in a competitive environment. During 
games, participants are placed in teams and are provided with data, rules, and procedures 
to use to overcome a hypothetical active shooter situation (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013). Participating in games also provide participants with the opportunity to 
carefully examine the consequences associated with certain decisions and actions. 
Participating in games may help faculty further develop their outcome expectations and 
adjust their behaviors to meet their expectations (Bandura, 1986). Games provide an 
avenue for participants to practice working together as a team to survive active shooter 
situations. 
Operations-based exercises are mock exercises. During operations-based activities 
such as active shooter drills, functional exercises, and full-scale exercises, participants 
practice how to respond to active shooter threats and situations on the campus grounds 
and in campus buildings (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of 
Higher Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). Drills permit 
participants to practice and maintain the active shooter response skills that they acquired 
during the discussion-based training exercises (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
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2013). Drills also help institutions refine active shooter procedures and test active shooter 
communications.  
According to recent research, functional and full-scale exercises are the least 
commonly used form of AST at IHLs (Sullivan & Perry, 2014; The National Center for 
Campus Public Safety, 2016). Functional and full-scale exercises are an extension of 
active shooter drills. During functional exercises the campus community practices 
implementing the emergency management plan and procedures during a realistic active 
shooter simulation (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher 
Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). Full scale exercises are 
the most expensive and most time-consuming training exercises to perform (Action 
Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013). Full scale exercises are an extension of 
functional exercises. During full scale exercises, participants also engage in a realistic 
simulated active shooter incident. However, full scale exercises involve students, staff, 
faculty, and all other emergency responders and community stakeholders. These 
exercises allow institutions to test the collaborative efforts of the campus community, 
personnel, agencies, communication systems, equipment, and public information systems 
(Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). Operations-based exercises help 
participants build self-efficacy and permit the crisis management team to identify and 
correct misunderstandings and deficiencies (Bandura, 1986).  
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Active Shooter Training and Preparedness Research 
There is a limited amount of research available regarding ASTs and faculty active 
shooter preparedness at IHLs. Between the years of 2001 and 2016 several dissertation 
research studies have been conducted that included some sort of active shooter 
preparedness or AST examination (Akers, 2007; Ellies, 2015; Lott, 2012; Myers, 2016; 
Pitrowski, 2014; Snyder, 2014; Zdziarski, 2001). AST and preparedness have been 
examined via both quantitative and qualitative methods with most using survey 
methodology. Both experimental and non-experimental research designs have been used 
to explore this area of research, however non-experimental designs were most frequently 
employed.  
In 2014, Snyder examined the effects of AST on students’ perceptions of personal 
safety. Snyder employed an experimental design for this research. Students were placed 
in four groups, groups one through three each received a different AST treatment. One 
group completed the DHS’s active shooter resilience training, one group completed a 
private active shooter resilience course, and one group completed both training programs 
(Snyder, 2014). The fourth group was deemed the control and did not receive any type of 
training. Snyder’s study showed that each training treatment had a positive influence in 
either the students’ perceptions of safety, fear, and resilience (Snyder, 2014).  
Pitrowski conducted a research study similar to Snyder’s in 2014. Pitrowski 
examined the influence of training seminars on the emergency preparedness of 
administrators and faculty. The participants of this study participated in either an active 
shooter threat seminar, a hurricane preparedness seminar, a hazardous materials seminar, 
a combination of either two or three of the seminars, or engaged in no seminars 
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(Pitrowski, 2014). Pitrowski’s results indicated that faculty members who engaged in all 
3 seminars scored higher on the crisis preparedness survey (Pitrowski, 2014). Pitrowski 
(2014) and Snyder‘s (2014) results both indicated that training had a positive influence 
on preparedness.  
In efforts to assist in the development of a shared AST program for IHLs, Ellies 
(2015) attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of an AST program. A pretest/posttest 
experimental design was employed for this study. Thirty faculty and staff members from 
the same university participated in this study. Ellies found that after engaging in the 
training sessions, participants scored higher on the post training assessment than they did 
on the pre-training assessment (Ellies, 2015). The findings from Snyder (2014), Pitrowski 
(2014), and Ellies (2015) coincide with the literature that suggested that engaging in AST 
helps participants develop a survival mindset and that this mindset increases levels of 
perceived active shooter preparedness (Johnson et al., 2016; U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008). 
In 2016, Myers conducted a qualitative research study investigating the perceptions 
of institutional preparedness held by public safety directors at IHLs. She interviewed eight 
public safety directors from eight private institutions. In conjunction with conducting 
interviews, Myers reviewed institutional active shooter policies, training procedures, and 
protocols. Like the researchers who previously examined crisis management and 
preparedness, she found that preparedness efforts varied among institutions (Akers, 2007; 
Lott, 2012; Myers, 2016; Sullivan, 2012; Sullivan & Perry, 2014). Only half of the 
institutions that participated in this study reported having current active shooter policies. 
Out of the eight institutions that were represented, only two of the institutions reported 
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conducting mandatory AST (Myers, 2016). Voluntary ASTs were more prevalent, 
however, participation in these trainings were low. All the participants of Myers’ study 
reported that their institutions did not conduct mandatory active shooter drills or exercises 
(Myers, 2016). Although these findings cannot be generalized to the larger higher 
education population, these findings are also consistent with the research that suggests that 
IHLs are reactive in preparing for crisis situations (Booker, 2014; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 
2003; Mitroff et. al., 2006; Wang & Hutchins, 2010; Zdziarski, 2001). To increase faculty 
active shooter preparedness on college campuses, IHLs must provide faculty with effective 
AST (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; 
U.S. Department of Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). 
Summary 
Crisis management at IHLs has evolved over time due in part to the rise in active 
shooter incidents on college campuses. Research regarding active shooter preparedness 
generally suggests that IHLs are not fully compliant with campus safety legislation, that a 
culture of preparedness must be developed on every college campuses, and that faculty 
active shooter preparedness needs to be further cultivated. Prior research conducted by 
Zdziarski (2001), Lott (2012), and Liu et al. (2015) was the closest in similarity to the 
current research study. Overall, the literature lacked sufficient information pertaining to 
the effectiveness of AST and the preparation of faculty for active shooter situations. In 
seeking to increase understanding of faculty active shooter preparedness, Bandura’s 
Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) served as a theoretical foundation from which to examine 
the personal and cognitive factors, environmental factors, and behavioral factors that 
define faculty active shooter preparedness. 
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CHAPTER III – METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 The focus of this chapter is to describe the methodological procedures employed 
to examine faculty active shooter preparedness. A cross-sectional survey design was used 
in the current research study (Gay, Mills, Airasian, 2009). Survey data was collected 
from postsecondary faculty members. The data was analyzed using Qualtrics™.  
Research Questions 
This study aimed to answer the following questions: 
1. What is the nature of active shooter training at IHLs? 
2. To what extent do the reported elements of AST at IHLs align with the DOE’s 
recommendations for active shooter preparedness? 
3. What are the beliefs among faculty regarding the personal and cognitive factors 
that contribute to active shooter preparedness? 
4. What precautionary measures do faculty take to demonstrate active shooter 
preparedness? 
Participants 
As of the 2015-2016 academic year, there were 4,583 degree-granting IHLs in the 
United States including public, private, and for-profit 2-year and 4-year institutions 
(National Center for Educational Statistics, 2018). There was a total of 1,620 public 
institutions, 1,701 private non-profit institutions, and 1,262 private for-profit institutions. 
The target population for this study is postsecondary faculty. The National Center for 
Educational Statistics (NCES) defined faculty as, “professors, associate professors, 
assistant professors, instructors, lecturers, assisting professors, adjunct professors, and 
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interim professors” (2017). The NCES reported that as of fall 2015, there were about 1.6 
million postsecondary faculty members employed at degree-granting institutions in the 
United States (2017). Fifty-two percent of these faculty members were full time and 48% 
were part time (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2017). As of 2015, 42% of the 
total population of fulltime faculty were white males, 35 % were white females, and less 
than 20% of the population were minorities (National Center for Educational Statistics, 
2017).  
Sampling 
Due to the nature of this research, a nonprobability sampling approach was 
employed. A snowball sample was used to gather a snapshot of faculty active shooter 
preparedness. To capture the differences in faculty active shooter preparedness in IHLs 
across the United States, 2-year colleges were selected from states that have 100 or more 
degree granting IHLs. Private 4-year institutions were selected from states that have more 
than 48 degree-granting IHLs, and public 4-year institutions were selected from states 
with less than 49 degree-granting IHLs. Research indicated that the design of the college 
campus makes it more vulnerable to active shooter situations and 70% of all active 
shooter incidents occur in educational settings (Blair & Scheweit, 2013; Sulkowski & 
Lazarus, 2011; Wang & Hutchins, 2010). Because of these findings, faculty from IHLs 
with physical campuses were selected to participate in the current study. A list of the 
contacted IHLs is attached to Appendix A. 
The target population for this study was easily accessible. Postsecondary faculty 
from around the United States were recruited for this study via institutional email. Once 
IRB approval was obtained from the University of Southern Mississippi, the dean of each 
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college or the director of each academic department at each institution was contacted via 
email with a request to electronically distribute the questionnaire and all pertinent 
information to their faculty. Participation in this study was completely voluntary.  
Data Collection 
Research Design 
 This study employed a cross-sectional survey design. This research design was 
selected to gather information regarding faculty active shooter preparedness. The cross-
sectional survey design permitted the researcher to quickly gather data regarding 
faculty’s demographics, background, environmental factors, personal and cognitive 
factors, and behavioral factors as they pertain to active shooter preparedness. This 
research design was also selected because of its replicability.  
Procedures 
Prior to distributing the instrument to participants, a pilot study was conducted. 
Gay et al. (2009) noted that pilot testing provides the researcher with suggestions for 
improvement and it helps the researcher identify errors or discrepancies. Five faculty 
members were included in the pilot testing of the Faculty Active Shooter Preparedness 
Survey (FASPS). These faculty members were encouraged to provide constructive 
feedback regarding the instrument. The FASPS was revised based on the results from the 
pilot testing (Gay et al., 2009). Once revisions were completed, the FASPS was 
submitted with the IRB application to the University of Southern Mississippi’s 
Institutional Research Board (IRB). 
Before recruiting participants for this study, approval was obtained from IRB. The 
IRB approval form is attached as Appendix B. Once IRB approval was granted, the dean 
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or department director from each institution was contacted by email and asked to forward 
the recruitment email to their faculty. The recruitment email contained an overview of the 
research study and instructions for responding to the survey. The recruitment email is 
attached as Appendix C.  
The IRB approval form and a comprehensive information letter were included as 
attachments to the recruitment email. Prospective participants were informed that their 
identities would not be revealed in both the recruitment email and the information letter. 
They were also informed of the benefits and potential risks associated with participating 
in the study, as well as who to contact if they had questions regarding the study. The 
comprehensive information letter included a statement that read, “By completing the 
attached survey, the respondent gives permission for the anonymous data to be used for 
the purposes described above.” By continuing to the survey and submitting their 
responses, the respondents provided informed consent regarding their rights as 
participants and allowed the researcher to utilize the data collected as it was outlined in 
the information letter. The information letter is attached as Appendix D.   
The initial recruitment email was distributed on May 9, 2018. An additional 
recruitment email was sent out on May 18, 2018 to improve the participation rate. The 
survey data was collected from May 9th to May 29th. No survey responses were accepted 
after May 29th. On May 30th, the researcher began analyzing the survey data.  
Instrumentation 
Due to the lack of an available instrument pertaining to the current 
conceptualization of faculty active shooter preparedness, the questionnaire used in this 
study was created by the researcher using Qualtrics™. The Faculty Active Shooter 
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Preparedness Survey (FASPS) was used to collect data for this research study. A web-
based method was used to distribute the questionnaire to participants and collect data 
regarding faculty active shooter preparedness. Rea and Parker noted that with web-based 
questionnaires, participants are contacted via email and asked to participate in the study 
(2005). After agreeing to participate in the study, the participants completed the 
questionnaire online and their results were submitted electronically (Rea & Parker, 2005).  
There are several advantages and disadvantages associated with using a web-
based method. The web-based method yields fast results and is a cost-efficient way to 
reach the target population (Gay et al., 2009; Rea & Parker, 2005). The web-based 
method allows for easy follow up with the participants. It also provides the researcher 
with the means to keep participants’ identities confidential (Gay et al., 2009; Rea & 
Parker, 2005). Using a web-based questionnaire allowed the researcher to standardize 
procedures and questions for the participants (Gay et al., 2009). However, the 
disadvantages of using a web-based questionnaire distribution method include: the lack 
of researcher involvement, self-selection bias, and the possibility of participants replying 
to the questionnaire more than once (Gay et al., 2009; Rea & Parker, 2005). Also, with 
the web-based method, the researcher cannot probe the participants, explain questionnaire 
items or ask follow-up questions while the participants are completing the questionnaire 
(Gay et al., 2009). 
The FASPS contained 52 questions and it was divided into eight sections: 
demographics/background, the nature of ASTs, organizational vulnerability and 
preparedness, forethought, thoughts about training, behaviors, self-efficacy, and transfer. 
The instrument consisted of primarily of closed-ended questions. Closed-ended questions 
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were used because closed-ended questions limit irrelevant responses and provide the 
respondents with uniform answer choices (Rea & Parker, 2005). Rea and Parker indicated 
that closed-ended questions also increase question response rate. Using closed-ended 
questions allowed the researcher to make clean comparisons between respondents (Rea & 
Parker, 2005). This will be useful when attempting to identify the differences and 
similarities between groups. Single answer and multiple answer multiple-choice items 
were used to capture respondents' demographic information, background information, 
and behaviors. Nominal response items were used to label different factors and capture 
the frequency in which certain factors occurred (Rea & Parker, 2005). Ordinal scaled 
Likert type items were used to gauge respondents’ attitudes and beliefs (Rea & Parker, 
2005). Both four and 5-point Likert type scales were used for the scaled response items 
(Rea & Parker, 2005). All the items included in the FASPS were informed by the 
literature (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 
2010; Bandura, 1986; Ellies, 2015; Howard, 2015; Johnson et al., 2016; Kapucu & 
Khosa, 2013, Pitrowski, 2014; Snyder, 2014; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2008, 2013; Zdziarski, 2016).  
The terms active shooter, active shooter situation, and active shooter training were 
defined for the participants in the instrument. These definitions were included in efforts 
to eliminate misunderstandings while responding to the survey. The instrument is 
attached as Appendix E.  
Conceptualization and Operationalization  
 Active shooter preparedness involves being in a state of readiness to deter or 
engage in active shooter situations (Action Guide for Emergency Management at 
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Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Education, 2010; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008). For the purposes of the current research study, 
active shooter preparedness has been conceptualized as the interaction between faculty 
members’ environmental factors, personal and cognitive factors, and behaviors in 
reaction to AST. These variables each influence faculty members’ perceptions of their 
level of active shooter preparedness. The interaction between these variables also 
influences the extent to which faculty members utilize precautionary behaviors. The 
responses captured in the sections 2 through 8, serve as indicators of faculty active 
shooter preparedness. 
Variables 
Demographic/Background. To gather demographic and background data about the 
respondents, the first section of the instrument contained multiple-choice items regarding 
race, gender, rank, institution type, region, and exposure to active shooter incidents. The 
first section of the instrument also contained two questions that prompted respondents to 
input their age and years of service as a faculty member. Eight items were used to capture 
demographic data and three items were used to capture background data. The 
demographic data were useful for determining if the sample adequately represented the 
faculty population. This information was also useful for making comparisons between 
groups. The background data were useful for capturing the respondents’ exposure to 
active shooter situations. 
Environmental Factors. With regard to active shooter preparedness, environmental 
factors are conceptualized as the campus culture; which includes the nature of active 
shooter training (Johnson et al., 2016; Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; Howard, 2015; Zdziarski, 
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2016). To obtain a better understanding of the nature of faculty ASTs, the FASPS 
contained 15 items that addressed institutional active shooter preparation efforts. In item 
1.12 respondents were asked to indicate if participating in AST was optional or 
mandatory at their IHL.  
In the beginning of section two, a screening question was asked to determine 
which items the respondents needed to answer next (Rea & Parker, 2005). The screening 
question asked if the respondents had received AST at their institution. If the respondents 
selected no, they skipped the next set of items in section two and moved to the third 
section of the instrument. In section two, the respondents were prompted to report the 
number of ASTs they participated in during the 2017-2018 academic year. They were 
also prompted to report the number of active shooter drills, the number of functional 
exercises, and the number of full-scale exercises that were conducted at their institution 
each year. Multiple answer multiple-choice items were used to allow respondents to 
select the different types of active shooter training exercises they have participated in, the 
components included in the ASTs, and the survival tactics that were modeled during their 
ASTs. With regard to those items, respondents were instructed to select from lists all that 
applied. In item 2.10 respondents were asked if they were permitted to ask questions 
during AST. In item 2.11 respondents were asked if they were given the opportunity to 
provide feedback after AST.  
In section three of the FASPS, items 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 have also been classified as 
questions regarding environmental factors. Items 3.1 and 3.3 prompted respondents to 
select yes or no to indicate if a culture of preparedness has been established on their 
campus and if the active shooter policies had been shared with them. Item 3.2 prompted 
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respondents to select either yes, no, or unsure to indicate if their institution has active 
shooter policies. The data obtained from the aforementioned 15 items were useful for 
determining the nature of AST at IHLs. 
Personal and Cognitive Factors. Personal and cognitive factors help explain human 
behavior (Bandura, 1986). Faculty members’ beliefs and attitudes regarding their 
personal safety, organizational vulnerability, active shooter training, preparedness, 
efficacy, attentional processes, forethought, and anticipated outcomes are the personal 
and cognitive factors being analyzed in this research.  
The FASPS contained 19 items that inquired about various personal and cognitive 
factors. Six of these items were included in section three of the instrument. These six 
items pertained to faculty members’ perspectives regarding personal safety, 
organizational vulnerability, fear, and active shooter preparedness. Items 3.4 and 3.5 deal 
with safety. In item 3.4, respondents were asked to select either yes or no to indicate 
whether they feel safe on campus. In item 3.5, respondents were asked to indicate how 
safe they perceived their campus to be by selecting either very safe, somewhat safe, 
neutral, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe. Item 3.6 deals with forethought. Item 3.6 asked 
respondents to indicate the likelihood that an active shooter situation could occur on their 
campus by selecting either extremely likely, likely, unlikely, or extremely unlikely. Item 
3.7 dealt with personal fear. In item 3.7 respondents were asked to rate their level of fear 
of being involved in an active shooter situation on campus by selecting either extremely 
fearful, fearful, slightly fearful, or not fearful at all. Items 3.10 and 3.11 dealt with active 
shooter preparedness. For these items respondents were asked to assess their level of 
personal preparedness to engage in active shooter situations and the level of preparedness 
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of their colleagues by selecting either extremely prepared somewhat prepared, somewhat 
unprepared, or extremely unprepared.  
Three of the 19 items used to capture faculty members’ personal and cognitive 
factors were in section four of the FASPS. These three items pertained to forethought. In 
items 4.1 and 4.2 respondents were asked to indicate by selecting yes or no, if they have 
thought about the possibility of being involved in an active shooter situation on campus 
and if they have thought about the actions they would need to take if an active shooter 
enters their classroom or office. In item 4.3 respondents were prompted to indicate their 
level of concern regarding active shooters on campus by selecting either extremely 
concerned, moderately concerned, somewhat concerned, slightly concerned, or not at all 
concerned.  
Section five of the FASPS contained four of the 19 items used to capture faculty 
members’ personal and cognitive factors. These four items pertained to the respondents’ 
thoughts about training. Items 5.1 and 5.2 dealt with the attentional processes. In item 
5.1, respondents were asked to indicate how important they believe ASTs were by 
selecting either extremely important, very important, moderately important, slightly 
important, or not at all important. In item 5.2, respondents were asked to indicate the 
level of attention they provide during ASTs by selecting either high, medium, low, none, 
or I have not had AST. Item 5.3 deals with observational learning. In item 5.3, 
respondents were asked to indicate if they believe they learn from watching others 
engage in AST by selecting either yes, no, or I have not had AST. Item 5.4 deals with 
motivational processes. Item 5.4 asked faculty to indicate the level of usefulness of the 
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information shared in AST by selecting either extremely useful, very useful, moderately 
useful, slightly useful, or not at all useful.  
Two of the 19 items used to capture faculty members’ personal and cognitive 
factors were in section six of the FASPS. Items 6.1 and 6.2 also deal with motivational 
processes. In item 6.1 respondents were asked to indicate if the potential threat of an 
active shooter motivated them to take precautionary measures by selecting either yes or 
no. In item 6.2 respondents were asked to indicate the level of influence they believe their 
actions would have on an active shooter situation by selecting either extremely 
influential, very influential, slightly influential, somewhat influential, or not at all 
influential.  
The final four of the 19 items used to capture faculty members’ personal and 
cognitive factors were in section seven of the FASPS. Items 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 deal 
with self-efficacy. In items 7.1 and 7.2, respondents were asked about their level of 
confidence in their ability to perform the necessary actions during and after an active 
shooter situation prior to receiving AST. In items 7.3 and 7.4, respondents were asked 
about their level of confidence in their ability to perform the necessary actions during and 
after an active shooter situation after receiving AST. Respondents were prompted to 
indicate their level of confidence in each item by selecting either extremely confident, 
moderately confident, slightly confident, somewhat confident, not at all confident, or I 
have not had active shooter training. The data obtained from the aforementioned 19 items 
were useful for obtaining information regarding personal and cognitive factors. 
Behaviors. Behaviors are conceptualized as the precautionary actions used by faculty to 
deter active shooter situations and the survival actions employed by faculty to engage in 
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active shooter situations (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of 
Higher Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). The presence or 
absence of the use of precautionary and survival behaviors may be indicative of the level 
of faculty active shooter preparedness.  
The FASPS contained seven items that examined faculty behaviors. Two of these 
items were in the third section of the instrument. Item 3.8 dealt with intent. Item 3.8 
asked respondents to indicate the likelihood that they would employ precautionary 
behaviors after the knowledge of the vulnerability of the college campus by selecting 
either extremely likely, likely, unlikely, or extremely unlikely. Item 3.9 deals with affect. 
Item 3.9 asked respondents to indicate the level of affect employing precautionary 
behaviors has on the campus community by selecting either major effect, moderate affect, 
minor affect, or no affect.  
Two of the seven items that examined faculty behaviors were in the sixth section 
of the FASPS. Items 6.3 and 6.4 asked the respondents to report the precautionary actions 
that they took on campus before and after receiving AST. Respondents were prompted to 
select all that apply from the following list: opted into campus safety texts or email alerts, 
programmed the contact number for campus police in your cellphone, promptly reported 
any suspicious persons, vehicles, or activity, knowledgeable of evacuation routes, locking 
office doors, locking classroom doors, being alert and aware of surroundings, taking self-
defense classes, participating in AST exercises, knowledgeable of active shooter response 
procedures, or I did not take any precautionary actions.  
The final three of the seven items used to explore faculty behaviors were in 
section eight of the FASPA. Item 8.1 deals with intent to transfer. In item 8.1, 
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respondents were asked to indicate the likelihood that they would follow the procedures 
they learned in AST during an active shooter situation by selecting either extremely 
likely, likely, unlikely, extremely unlikely, or I have not had AST. Items 8.2 and 8.3 deal 
with transfer. In item 8.2, respondents were asked to input the number of times they 
discussed active shooter policies with their students during each academic term. In item 
8.3, respondents were asked to indicate if they included information about active shooter 
threats in their course syllabus by selecting either yes or no. The data obtained from the 
aforementioned 7 items were useful for obtaining information regarding faculty 
behaviors. 
Prior Reliability and Validity.  
Liu et al. (2015) was the only relevant research study that contained some of the 
measures that were included in the FASPS. These measures were: perceptions of 
vulnerability and preparedness, awareness, knowledge, and self-efficacy. The researchers 
reported a Cronbach alpha for each scale of measurement used in their research. Liu et al. 
(2015) reported a Cronbach alpha of .760 for vulnerability, .70 for preparedness, .833 for 
awareness, .907 for knowledge, and .927 for self-efficacy. Both Zdziarski (2001) and 
Lott (2012) reported pilot testing as a means to ensure the reliability and validity of their 
instruments. Both studies lacked specific information regarding the reliability and 
validity of the measures in their instruments.   
Data Analysis 
Initially, data was collected via Qualtrics™. Basic statistical data was generated 
from the FASPS results. Frequencies and measures of central tendency were obtained to 
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summarize the data (Rea & Parker, 2005). Trends within the data were identified based 
on the summary data. Frequencies were used to answer the research questions.  
After analyzing the data, the data was compared to prior literature and to the 
recommendations from the DOE and DHS. Consistencies and inconsistences between the 
data and prior literature were also identified. Consistencies and inconsistences between 
the reported elements of active shooter training and the recommended elements of active 
shooter training were identified.  
The data analysis used in the current research study is consistent with the data 
analysis that were conducted by Zdziarski (2001), Lott (2012), and Liu et al. (2015). The 
aforementioned researchers all used survey data to describe crisis management and/or 
crisis preparedness. Out of all the relevant research, the aforementioned studies were the 
closest in similarity to the current research. Zdziarski (2001) and Lott (2012) did not 
specifically examine faculty active shooter preparedness, as their research focused more 
on the examination of institutional crisis management. However, Liu et al.’s (2015) 
research was closely aligned to the current research as Liu et al. examined university 
employees’ perceptions of crisis preparedness and risks pertaining to school shootings.  
Summary 
This chapter outlines the methodological procedures used to examine faculty 
active shooter preparedness at IHLs. A cross-sectional survey design was employed to 
obtain quantitative data from the sample population. Faculty members from IHLs across 
the United States were solicited via institutional email to complete the FASPS. The data 
analysis procedures employed in this study are consistent with the data analysis 
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procedures used in the literature. Frequencies were generated to summarize the data and 
answer the research questions.  
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CHAPTER IV – ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 A quantitative research study was conducted to obtain a better understanding of 
the current state of active shooter preparedness among faculty employed by IHLs within 
the United States. The findings from the Faculty Active Shooter Preparedness Survey 
(FASPS) are presented in this chapter. The findings are organized by the research 
questions. This chapter includes a brief overview of the of the methodological 
procedures, a description of the sample, description of the background items, data 
pertaining to RQ 1, data pertaining to RQ 2, data pertaining to RQ 3, data pertaining to 
RQ 4, and a summary.  
The FASPS was distributed on May 9, 2018 via email to deans/department 
directors at 51 IHLs across the U.S. A total of 425 recruitment emails were sent. On May 
18, 2018 follow-up emails were sent to encourage participation from non-respondents. 
One hundred seven faculty members responded during the recruitment period. Of the 107 
respondents, 98 faculty members completed the FASPS and nine partially completed it. 
Partially completed surveys were excluded from the current analysis resulting in a sample 
size of 98. The data obtained from the FASPS was analyzed using Qualtrics™. 
Frequencies were generated for the responses in each item. The frequencies were used to 
summarize respondents’ demographic and background information, and to answer 
research questions.  
Description of Sample 
The sample was chosen to be representative of the target population. The sample 
included faculty members employed by IHLs from each region of the U.S. The number of 
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respondents varied among regions with the fewest in the Pacific region at 2.04% (N=2), 
6.12% (N=6) from the North, 10.20% (N=10) from the Midwest, 21.42% (N=21) from 
the Northeast, 22.45% (N=22) from the South, and 37.76 % (N=37) from the West for a 
total of 98 participants. With regard to institution type, 71.43 % (N=70) of respondents 
were employed at public IHLs while 28.57% (N=28) were employed at private IHLs. 
Additionally, 91.84% (N=90) of respondents were employed at universities and 8.16% 
(N=8) were employed at community colleges. Within this sample 8.16% (N=8) were 
adjuncts or lecturers, 32.65 % (N=32) were assistant professors, 16.33 % (N=16) were 
associate professors, and 42.86% (N=42) were full professors. The sample is 81.37% 
(N=83) Caucasians and 18.62 % (N=15) Non-Caucasians with ages that ranged from 32 
to 75 years. With regard to gender, 38.78% (N=38) of the respondents were male, 
59.18% (N=58) were female, and 2.04% (N=2) chose not to disclose their gender. 
Respondents within the sample have between 1 to 46 years of service as postsecondary 
faculty.  
Findings 
The FASPS contained three items that inquired about prior exposure to active 
shooter situations. All of the 98 participants responded to these items. Of the 98 
respondents, 92.86% (N=91) of faculty reported that neither they nor their immediate 
family had been involved in an active shooter incident while on a college campus. 
Likewise, 90.82% (N=89) reported that neither they nor their immediate family had been 
involved in an active shooter incident outside of a college campus. Roughly 94.90% 
(N=93) of faculty viewed media coverage of active shooter incidents that occurred on a 
college campus. These findings indicated that while most of the respondents did not have 
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direct experience with active shooters, the vast majority of them did have prior exposure 
to such events through media coverage.  
RQ 1: What is the nature of active shooter training at IHLs? 
In alignment with Bandura’s SCT, active shooter training (AST) was classified as 
the environment. Active shooter training was classified as the environment because it is 
the context in which faculty are prepared for active shooter incidents. Twelve of 52 items 
on the FASPS inquired about the nature of active shooter training at IHLs. Of the 98 
respondents, 57.14% (N=56) received AST from their institution. Additionally, AST was 
mandatory for only 33.67 % (N=33) of respondents. Respondents were asked if a culture 
of preparedness had been established at their institution with regards to active shooters. 
Over half of the respondents (61.22%) reported that a culture of preparedness had not 
been established at their institution. 
Within the sample, 56 respondents received AST from their institution. These 
faculty members responded to 10 additional questions on the FASPS regarding AST. 
There was little variation in the quantity of AST received during the 2017-2018 academic 
year. Most respondents (N=37) participated in only one training session, while hardly 
(N=5) any participated in two or more sessions. Interestingly, several respondents (N=13) 
received no training at all. The duration of training sessions varied among respondents. 
AST sessions for the majority of participants (58.93%) were typically less than one hour. 
A much smaller percentage of respondents (28.57%) participated in AST sessions lasting 
more than one hour. Even less respondents (12.50%) participated in AST sessions lasting 
two or more hours.  
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When asked to report the number of active shooter drills, functional exercises, and 
full-scale exercises that were conducted at their institution per year, 28.57% (N=16) 
reported that at least one drill was conducted per year. Only 10.71% (N=6) reported that 
at least one functional exercise was conducted per year. Less than that, 7.14% (N=4) 
reported that at least one full-scale exercise was conducted per year. 
Respondents varied substantially with regards to the types of AST received. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the types of AST respondents participated in at their 
institutions. Seminars and online training were the most common types of AST received, 
followed by workshops. As mentioned in Chapter 1, online training, seminars, workshops 
are classified as discussion-based trainings. The data indicated that respondents received 
more discussion-based training exercises than operations-based training exercises, thus 
indicating that operations-based exercises were seldomly conducted at the IHLs 
represented by the sample. 
Figure 2. Types of Active Shooter Training Received (Frequencies) 
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Figure 3. Types of Active Shooter Training Received (Percentages) 
 
Among respondents, AST involved numerous components. Figures 4 and 5 show 
the components of AST as the respondents were instructed to select all of the components 
included in the AST they received. As illustrated in Figures 4 and 5, more respondents 
were exposed to lectures, videos, scenarios, group discussions, and survival tactics during 
AST than readings, simulations, role play, modeling, news media, and games. These 
results coincided with the previous results in that institutional ASTs rely heavily on 
discussion-based training methods. 
Figure 4. Active Shooter Training Components (Frequencies) 
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Figure 5. Active Shooter Training Components (Percentages) 
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Respondents participated in trainings that covered the following survival tactics: 
“Run, Hide, Fight”, “Lock Down”, “Avoid, Deny, Defend”, and “See Something, Say 
Something”. Prior to 2013, “Lock Down” was considered the standard survival tactic 
employed to combat active shooters in educational settings (Guide for developing high 
quality emergency operations plans for institutions of higher education, 2013). Only 20% 
of respondents were exposed to the “Lock Down” survival tactic. After 2013, the DHS 
and DOE found that “Lock Down” procedures alone were not sufficient to deter active 
shooters. As a result, “Run, Hide, Fight” became the standard survival tactic 
recommended to institutions (Guide for developing high quality emergency operations 
plans for institutions of higher education, 2013). In conjunction with that, the DHS and 
DOE also recommended that institutions use a variety of tactics. Most of the respondents 
(45.26%) were exposed to “Run, Hide, Fight”. In addition to that, 17.89% of respondents 
were exposed to “See Something, Say Something” and 16.84%  were exposed to “Avoid, 
Deny, Defend”. These findings indicated that most of the respondents were unfamiliar 
with the recommended survival tactics. During AST, most of the respondents (69.64%) 
had the opportunity to ask questions to clear up any misunderstandings.   
RQ 2: To what extent do the reported elements of AST at higher education institutions 
align with the DOE’s recommendations for active shooter preparedness? 
The Higher Education Act of 2008 mandated that IHLs have emergency response 
and evacuation procedures. It also instructed IHLs to annually disclose these procedures 
to faculty, staff, and students (Fox & Savage, 2009; U.S. Department of Education, 
2010). Less than half of respondents 43.88% (N=43) indicated that their institution had 
active shooter policies. Of those 43 respondents, 88.37% (N=38) indicated that 
 66 
institutional active shooter policies had been shared with them. These findings suggest 
that some of the IHLs represented by the sample are not compliant with the Higher 
Education Act. 
The DOE recommended that IHLs provide training to personnel, however only 
57.14% (N=56) of respondents received AST from their institution. The Higher 
Education Act of 2008 also mandated IHLs to test emergency responses and evacuation 
procedures (Fox & Savage, 2009; U.S. Department of Education, 2010). Emergency 
responses and evacuation procedures are tested during operations-based AST exercises. 
Of the 56 respondents that received AST, 71.43% (N=40) indicated that their IHL did not 
conduct active shooter drills, 89.29% (N=50) indicated that their IHL did not conduct 
functional exercises, and 92.86% (N=52) indicated that their IHL did not conduct full-
scale exercises. This indicated that at most of the institutions represented by the sample, 
emergency responses and evacuation procedures were not being tested as recommended.  
In the Action Guide of Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher 
Education, the DOE recommended that IHLs periodically train personnel and utilize a 
full range of training exercises ranging from discussion-based exercises to operations-
based exercises (2010). Findings revealed that a full range of training exercises were not 
being conducted at most of the IHLs represented in this study because operation-based 
training exercises were seldomly conducted. The findings from the FASPS also revealed 
that there is a substantial amount of the sample that had not received AST (42.86%) and 
had not been exposed to active shooter policies (47.92%). Thus, the reported elements of 
AST do not align with the DOE recommendations for active shooter preparedness.  
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RQ 3: What are the beliefs among faculty regarding the personal and cognitive factors 
that contribute to active shooter preparedness? 
In alignment with Bandura’s SCT, the personal and cognitive factors that 
contributed to active shooter preparedness were examined. On the FASPS, faculty were 
asked 16 questions regarding these factors. Respondents were asked about their 
perceptions of personal safety, campus safety, organizational vulnerability, personal fear, 
active shooter preparedness, and colleagues’ preparedness. Respondents were also asked 
about forethought, their level of concern toward active shooter threats, the importance of 
AST,  the level of attention provided during training, observational learning during 
training, beliefs about self-efficacy, and the use of precautionary behaviors. 
When examining perceptions of personal safety, most respondents (87.76%) felt 
safe on their campus. With regards to institution type, a greater percentage of respondents 
employed by private IHLs (92.86%; 26 of 28) felt safer on campus than those employed 
by public IHLs (85.71%; 60 of 70). Comparatively, respondents that participated in AST 
(89.29%; 50 of 56) felt safer on campus than those that had not participated in AST 
(85.71%; 36 of 42). As expected more of the respondents that perceived themselves as 
prepared for active shooter events felt safe (92%; 46 of 50) on campus that those that 
perceived themselves as unprepared (83.33%; 40 of 48). These particular distinctions 
may be expected to some degree seeing as how preparation is likely to be conducive to 
perceptions of safety. 
Perceptions of campus safety varied among respondents yet most of respondents 
(75.51%) agreed that their campuses were safe. With regard to institution type, a greater 
percentage of respondents employed by private IHLs (85.17%; 24 of 28) perceived their 
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campus to be safe than those employed by public IHLs (71.43%; 50 of 70). 
Comparatively, more respondents that participated in AST (76.79%; 43 of 56) perceived 
their campus as safe than those that have not participated in AST (73.81%; 31 of 42). 
Overall, 44.90% (N=44) of respondents believed that it was likely for an active 
shooter incident to occur on their campus and 1.02% (N=1) believed it was extremely 
likely. Conversely, 43.88% (N=43) believed it was unlikely and 10.20% (N=10) believed 
that it was extremely unlikely. Figure 6 and Figure 7 provide a graphical representation 
of respondents’ beliefs regarding the likelihood of an active shooter on campus by 
institution type. Comparatively, a greater percentage of respondents from public IHLs 
(51.43%; 36 of 70) believed that an active shooter incident was likely to occur on their 
campuses than respondents from private IHLs (31.03%; 9 of 29). On the other hand, a 
greater percentage of respondents from private IHLs (65.52%; 19 of 29) believed it was 
unlikely for active shooter incidents to occur on their campus than respondents from 
public IHLs (48.57%; 34 of 70). These finding reinforce the idea that respondents 
employed private IHLs feel safer on campus than respondents employed by public IHLs. 
Figure 6. Likelihood of Active Shooter Incidents by Institution Type (Frequencies) 
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Figure 7. Likelihood of Active Shooter Incidents by Institution Type (Percentages) 
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Overall, none of the respondents were extremely fearful of being involved in an  
active shooter situation while on campus. Interestingly, a substantial number of 
respondents (37.76%) were not fearful of the possible occurrence of an active shooter 
situation on campus. Only 11.22% (N=11) of respondents reported being fearful and 
51.02% (N=50) reported being slightly fearful.  
Figure 8 and Figure 9 shows a graphical representation of the levels of fear by 
institution type. Comparatively, more respondents employed by private IHLs (53.57%; 
15 of 28) than respondents employed by public IHLs (31.43%; 22 of 70) were not fearful 
of being involved in an  active shooter situation while on campus. Additionally, more 
respondents employed by public IHLs (54.29%; 38 of 70) than respondents employed by 
private IHLs (42.86%; 12 of 28) were slightly fearful. Lastly, more respondents 
employed by public IHLs (14.29%; 10 of 70) than respondents employed by private IHLs 
(3.57%; 1 of 28) were fearful of being involved in an active shooter situation while on 
campus. These findings showed that respondents employed by private IHLs are less 
fearful of being involved an active shooter incident than those employed by public IHLs. 
Figure 8. Level of Fear by Institution Type (Frequencies) 
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Figure 9. Level of Fear by Institution Type (Percentages) 
 
Respondents varied in their levels of perceived preparedness to handle active 
shooter incidents. Overall, 51.02% (N=50) of respondents reported that they were 
prepared to handle an active shooter incident on campus and 48.98% (N=48) reported 
they were unprepared. Within the levels of reported unpreparedness, 17.35% (N=17) of 
respondents reported being extremely unprepared to handle active shooter incidents.  
Figure 10 and Figure 11 show a breakdown of the levels of active shooter 
preparedness reported by the presence or absence of AST. Respondents who received 
AST were more prepared (69.64%; 39 of 56)  than those that did not (26.19%; 11 of 42). 
On the other hand, respondents who did not received AST were more unprepared 
(73.81%; 31 of 42) than respondents who had AST (30.36%; 17 of 56). Also, more of the 
respondents who had no AST reported being extremely unprepared (33.33%; 14 of 42) to 
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handle active shooter situations than those that had AST (5.36%; 3 of 56). These findings 
indicated a link between AST and active shooter preparedness. It is also worthy to point 
out that despite training a substantial percentage of respondents (39.29%) still perceived 
themselves as being underprepared to handle active shooter situations.  
Figure 10. Active Shooter Preparedness (Frequencies) 
 
Figure 11. Active Shooter Preparedness (Percentages) 
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With regard to the respondents’ perceptions of their colleagues’ active shooter 
preparedness, more than half of the respondents (66.33%) perceived their colleagues as  
unprepared to handle active shooter situations. With regard to forethought, 92.86% 
(N=91) of respondents reported they have thought about the possibility of being involved 
in an active shooter situation while on campus. Additionally, 92.86% (N=91) of 
respondents have also thought about the actions that they would need to take in the event 
that an active shooter enters their office or classroom. 
Figure 12 and Figure 13 provide a graphical depiction of respondents’ level of 
concern regarding active shooters on campus. Overall, most respondents (85.71%) 
reported some level of concern regarding active shooters on campus. Only 14.29% 
(N=14) were not concerned. 
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Figure 12. Level of Concern Regarding Active Shooters on Campus (Frequencies) 
 
Figure 13. Level of Concern Regarding Active Shooters on Campus (Percentages) 
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Respondents were assessed in terms of their perceived importance of AST. Only 
4.08% (N=4) of respondents (N=98) believed that AST was not important. The rest of the 
respondents believed that AST was either slightly important (4.08%), moderately 
important (20.41%), very important (44.90%), or extremely important(26.53%). 
Of the 56 respondents who received AST, 62.50% (N=35) provided a high level 
of attention during AST while 26.79% (N=15) provided a medium level of attention. 
Only 7.14% (N=4) of respondents provided a low level of attention during AST, and 
none of the respondents paid no attention during AST. 
With regard to observational learning, 46.43% (N=26) of the respondents who 
participated in AST believed they learned from watching their colleagues engage in 
active shooter training exercises. However, 25% (N=14) believed they did not learn 
anything from watching their colleagues. These findings indicated that observational 
learning occurs to some extent during active shooter training. When examining faculty 
beliefs about the usefulness of the information shared during AST, the majority of 
respondents (94.64%) who participated in AST believed that the information shared was 
useful.  
Concerning self-efficacy, prior to receiving AST, 64.29% (N=36) of respondents 
had some level of confidence in their ability to perform the necessary actions during an 
active shooter situation. However, 35.71% (N=20) of respondents were not confident in 
their ability to perform the necessary actions during an active shooter situation. After 
receiving AST, 94.64% (N=53) of respondents had some level of confidence in their 
ability to perform the necessary actions during active shooter situations and only 3.57% 
(N=2) of respondents were not confident in their ability. There was an increase in 
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confidence levels after the respondents participated in AST. These findings indicated that 
AST may be related to faculty self-efficacy in some way.  
Understanding that college campuses are open access environments, of all 
respondents (N= 98), 64.29% (N=63) believed they were likely to practice precautionary 
behaviors. Respondents that received AST were more likely to practice precautionary 
behaviors than those that did not receive AST. Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the 
likelihood of respondents employing precautionary behaviors based on the presence or 
absence of AST. Comparatively, respondents who participated in AST were more likely 
(66.07%; 37 of 56) to practice precautionary behaviors than respondents who did not 
participate in AST (61.90%; 26 of 42). On the other hand, respondents who did not 
participate in AST were more unlikely (38.10%; 16 of 42) to practice precautionary 
behaviors than respondents who participated in AST (33.93%; 19 of 56). These findings 
indicated that there may also be a link between AST and the use of precautionary 
behaviors. Interestingly, respondents from private IHLs were more likely (75%; 21 of 28) 
to practice precautionary behaviors than respondents from public IHLs (60%: 42 of 70). 
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Figure 14. Likelihood of Employing Precautionary Behaviors (Frequencies) 
 
Figure 15. Likelihood of Employing Precautionary Behaviors (Percentages) 
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Overall 83.67% (N=82) of respondents believed that employing precautionary 
behaviors had some level of effect on the on the campus community. More respondents 
employed by public IHLs (85.71%; 60 of 70) believed that employing precautionary 
behaviors affected the campus community than respondents employed by private IHLs 
(78.57%; 22 of 28). With regard to respondents’ motivation to practice precautionary 
behaviors, the potential threat of an active shooter motivated 57.14% (N=56) of 
respondents to practice precautionary behaviors. Over half of the respondents (86.73%) 
believed that their actions would have some level of influence in an active shooter 
situation. However, most of those respondents (41.84%) believed that their actions would 
only be slightly influential. When asked to indicate the likelihood of following 
procedures learned during AST during an active shooter situation, 67.35% (N=66) 
believed they were likely to follow procedures.   
RQ 4: What precautionary measures do faculty exhibit to demonstrate active shooter 
preparedness? 
In alignment with Bandura’s SCT, precautionary measures are classified as 
behaviors. Respondents were asked to choose from a list of precautionary actions that 
have been employed as measures to deter active shooter situations. Such actions included 
the following: opted into campus safety texts or email alerts, programmed the contact 
number for campus police in their cellphone, promptly reported any suspicious persons, 
vehicles, or activity, being knowledgeable of evacuation routes, locking office doors, 
locking classroom doors, being alert and aware of surroundings, taking self-defense 
classes, participating in active shooter training exercises, and being knowledgeable of 
active shooter response procedures. Figure 16 and Figure 17 show the precautionary 
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actions respondents took prior to participating in AST. Prior to receiving AST, opting 
into campus safety texts or email alerts was the most frequently (19.47%; 47 of 380) used 
precautionary measure. This was followed by being alert and aware of one’s 
surroundings(18.68%; 71 of 380), being knowledgeable of evacuation routes (14.76%; 56 
of 380), locking office doors (11.32%; 43 of 380), and promptly reporting suspicious 
persons, vehicles, or activity (10.53%; 40 of 380).  
Figure 16. Precautionary Actions Taken Prior to Receiving Active Shooter Training 
(Frequencies) 
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Figure 17. Precautionary Actions Taken Prior to Receiving Active Shooter Training 
(Percentages) 
 
Figure 18 and Figure 19 show the precautionary actions respondents took after 
they received active shooter training. After receiving AST, being alert and aware of one’s 
surroundings was the most frequently (13.51%; 45 of 333) used precautionary measure. 
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This was followed by being knowledgeable of evacuation routes (12.61%; 42 of 333) and 
opting into campus safety texts or email alerts (12.61%; 42 of 333), being knowledgeable 
of active shooter response procedures (12.31%; 41 of 333), promptly reporting suspicious 
persons, vehicles, or activity (9.31%; 31 of 333) and locking office doors (7.81%; 26 of 
333).  
Figure 18. Precautionary Actions Taken After Receiving Active Shooter Training 
(Frequencies) 
 
 82 
Figure 19. Precautionary Actions Taken After Receiving Active Shooter Training 
(Percentages)  
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Comparatively, after receiving AST, more respondents (66.07%) indicated that 
they were knowledgeable of active shooter response procedures than they did prior to 
receiving AST (24.53%). More respondents (23.21%) also indicated that they locked 
classroom doors after receiving AST than before receiving AST (18.87%). Surprisingly, 
the occurrence of opting into campus alerts, programming campus police contact number 
in cellphone, promptly reporting suspicious persons, vehicles, or activity, being 
knowledgeable of evacuation routes, locking office doors, and being alert of one’s 
surroundings decreased after receiving AST.  
 Only 26.53% (N=26) of respondents discussed active shooter procedures with 
their students. Additionally, only 3.06% (N=3) of respondents included information 
regarding active shooter threats in their syllabi. This indicated that most respondents did 
not discuss the possible threat of active shooters with their students nor did they 
disseminate information about active shooter procedures and evacuation routes to 
students.  
Summary 
Data obtained from the Faculty Active Shooter Preparedness Survey was 
presented in this chapter. Ninety-eight faculty members from across the United States 
completed the FASPS. The research questions were answered using the frequencies of 
the responses for each item. The findings revealed that some of the IHLs represented in 
the sample were not compliant with the DOE’s recommendations for active shooter 
preparedness. Only 57% of  the respondents received AST from their institution. 
Additionally, active shooter policies were only shared with 52.08% of the respondents. 
Overall, more respondents believed they were prepared for active shooter situations than 
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unprepared. Respondents who received AST believed they were more prepared than 
respondents who did not. Also, respondents employed by private IHLs believed their 
campuses were safer and felt safer on campus than respondents employed by public 
IHLs. Respondents also reported using a full range of precautionary behaviors to avert 
active shooters. The findings presented in this chapter are discussed further in chapter 
five. 
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CHAPTER V – DISCUSSION 
The primary goal of this study was to examine faculty active shooter 
preparedness. The study focused on the environmental, behavioral, personal, and 
cognitive factors that contributed to active shooter preparedness. The FASPS was 
developed to obtain a snapshot of active shooter preparedness among post-secondary 
faculty by examining faculty members’ active shooter incident exposure, AST, beliefs, 
and behaviors. The main aspect of this chapter is to discuss the findings from the FASPS, 
implications of the research, limitations associated with the study, and the directions for 
future research. In order to answer the research questions, findings from the FASPS were 
compared to prior crisis preparedness literature, recommendations from the Higher 
Education Act, and recommendations from the Department of Homeland Security. 
Personal and cognitive factors, environmental factors, and behaviors were discussed in 
order to further describe faculty active shooter preparedness. The current study employed 
a quantitative approach to answer the following four research questions: 
RQ 1: What is the nature of active shooter training at IHLs? 
RQ 2: To what extent do the reported elements of AST at IHLs align with the 
DOE’s recommendations for active shooter preparedness? 
RQ 3: What are the beliefs among faculty regarding the personal and cognitive 
factors that contribute to active shooter preparedness? 
RQ 4: What precautionary measures do faculty take to demonstrate active shooter 
preparedness? 
Research Question 1 
What is the nature of active shooter training at IHLs? 
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The literature indicated that AST is necessary to prepare people for active shooter 
situations  (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher 
Education, 2010; Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools Technical 
Assistance Center, n.d.; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The DOE also 
recommended that IHLs provide AST to personnel and students (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2010). A majority of the sample (57.14%) within the current study have 
received AST from their institution. Surprisingly, despite recent active shooter incidents 
within the U.S., the vulnerability of the college campus to active shooters, and 
recommendations from the DOE, some IHLs within the sample are still not providing 
AST to faculty (42.86%). In addition to that, participating in AST is not mandatory at 
most of the institutions (66.33%) represented by the sample. Findings supported literature 
that suggested that IHLs can be either proactive or reactive in their approach to crisis 
preparedness (Booker, 2014; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; Mitroff et. al., 2006; Wang & 
Hutchins, 2010; Zdziarski, 2001).  
As mentioned in chapter two, active shooter incidents occur quickly and progress 
quickly, so without the proper training, faculty are less likely to be prepared for active 
shooters (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 
2010; Ellies, 2015; Glover, 2016; Howard, 2015; Johnson et al., 2016; Lott, 2012; 
Pitrowski, 2014; Snyder, 2014; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013). Institutions that lack active shooter procedures 
and AST are more vulnerable to active shooters than institutions that have active shooter 
procedures in place and provide AST. The findings from the FASPS coincided with the 
literature because respondents who did not receive AST perceived themselves as less 
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prepared and more unprepared for active shooters than those who received training. 
Results from the FASPS indicated that there is a link between AST and active shooter 
preparedness. The findings from the FASPS supported research that indicated that 
training had a positive influence on preparedness (Ellis, 2015; Pitrowski, 2014; Snyder, 
2014). Respondents who received AST perceived themselves as more prepared and less 
unprepared than those who did not receive training. 
Prior research argued that maintaining a culture of preparedness toward active 
shooters within institutions is essential for active shooter preparedness (Johnson et al., 
2016; Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; Howard, 2015; Zdziarski, 2016). On the FASPS, more 
than half (61.22%) of the respondents in the sample reported that a culture of 
preparedness toward active shooters had not been established on their campuses. 
Unexpectedly, a substantial number of respondents who received AST (57.14%) also 
reported that a culture of preparedness had not been established on their campuses. This 
finding indicates that there were some deficiencies in the active shooter preparation 
efforts at the IHLs represented by the sample. Failure to create and maintain a culture of 
preparedness within IHLs could lead to more casualties during active shooter incidents.   
It is worthy to note that some of the respondents that received AST from their 
institution, did not receive AST during the 2017-2018 academic year. Institutions that do 
not provide yearly AST are not reinforcing active shooter procedures and are not 
practicing emergency responses and evacuation plans. Reinforcing procedures and 
practicing emergency responses and evacuation plans increase the likelihood that the 
appropriate actions will be carried out in the event of an active shooter situation (Action 
Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; Allen & 
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Lengfellner, 2016; Doherty, 2016; Guide for Developing High Quality Emergency 
Operations Plans for Institutions of Higher Education, 2013; Jenkins & Goodman, 2015; 
Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; Howard, 2015; Morris, 2014;  Zdziarski, 2016).  
As expected, types of training received, frequency of training, and duration of 
training varied among respondents. These variations may be the reason why some 
respondents who received AST perceived themselves as being more prepared than other 
respondents who also received AST. The literature stated that tabletop training exercises 
were the most common method of crisis preparedness training (Akers, 2007; Sullivan & 
Perry, 2014; The National Center for Campus Public Safety, 2016; U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008). However, the findings from the FASPS indicated that online 
training and seminars have replaced tabletop exercises as the most common methods of 
training used by IHLs. The literature also stated that functional and full-scale exercises 
were the least common method of crisis training used by IHLs (Sullivan & Perry, 2014; 
The National Center for Campus Public Safety, 2016). Findings from the FASPS confirm 
that functional and full-scale exercises were still the most seldomly used method of 
training at IHLs.  
As mentioned, drills, functional exercises, and full-scale exercises are operations-
based training methods. In relation to SCT, the absence of the use of operations-based 
training exercises, prohibits faculty from translating what they learned during discussion-
based training into actions. Additionally, the lack of rehearsal impairs the retention 
processes (Bandura, 1986). Bandura noted that practice combined with proper feedback 
yields the best results (1986). Although survival tactics are introduced and explained 
during discussion-based trainings, without operations-based trainings, respondents are not 
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given the opportunity to practice executing these tactics and are not receiving the 
necessary feedback. The lack of the use of operations-based training exercises hinders 
active shooter preparation efforts and limits active shooter preparedness. Respondents 
who have not participated in operations-based exercises may not have developed a 
survival mindset and may not be prepared for active shooter situations.  
Research Question 2 
To what extent do the reported elements of AST at IHLs align with the DOE’s 
recommendations for active shooter preparedness? 
As mentioned in chapter two, the DOE mandated that IHLs have emergency 
responses and evacuation procedures; annually disclose these procedures to faculty, staff 
and students; annually test emergency response and evacuation procedures; and 
immediately notify members of the campus community of threatening activity (Fox & 
Savage, 2009; U.S. Department of Education, 2010). Findings from the FASPS indicated 
that some of the IHLs represented by the sample were not compliant with the mandates 
from the DOE. Although most of the respondents (52.08%) indicated that active shooter 
policies had been shared with them, active shooter policies had not been shared with 
everyone in the sample (47.92%). A substantial number of respondents also reported that 
they were unsure if their institution had active shooter policies. This indicated that some 
IHLs are not annually disclosing active shooter policies to faculty. In addition to that, 
findings indicated that most of the IHLs represented by this sample are not annually 
testing emergency responses and evacuation procedures because they are not conducting 
operations-based training exercises. As previously mentioned, the DHS specified that 
engaging in operations-based training exercises is the best way to prepare for active 
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shooter incidents. During those type of training exercises, participants are given the 
opportunity to test and practice emergency responses and procedures (Action Guide for 
Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013).  
The DOE suggested that IHLs provide periodic AST to personnel, so that the 
campus community can be prepared for the onset of active shooter incidents (Action 
Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; U.S. 
Department of Education, 2010). It has been recommended by the DOE that IHLs use a 
full range of training, starting with orientation meetings and ending with full-scale 
exercises (Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 
2010; U.S. Department of Education, 2010). Findings from the FASPS revealed that most 
IHLs (57.14%) are providing AST to faculty. However, a full range of training exercises 
are not being used. Respondents reported that AST relied heavily on discussion-based 
trainings and operations-based trainings were seldomly used. The lack of operations-
based training exercises my leave faculty unprepared for active shooter situations. 
Without rehearsal, faculty will be less likely to retain what they have been taught during 
discussion-based training exercises and will feel less confident in their ability to handle 
active shooter situations. 
The DOE and DHS also recommended that a variety of survival tactics be used to 
deter active shooters (Guide for developing high quality emergency operations plans for 
institutions of higher education, 2013). In addition to that, in 2013 “Run, Hide, Fight” 
replaced “Lockdown” as the recommended survival tactic to be used by IHLs and schools 
(Guide for developing high quality emergency operations plans for institutions of higher 
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education, 2013). FASPS findings indicated that over half of the respondents had not 
been exposed to “Run, Hide, Fight” and less than that were exposed to “Lock Down”, 
“See Something, Say Something”, and “Avoid, Deny, Defend”. Respondents lacked 
exposure to the various recommended survival tactics; this implied another misalignment 
with the DOE’s recommendations.   
Research Question 3 
What are the beliefs among faculty regarding the personal and cognitive factors that 
contribute to active shooter preparedness? 
Overall, most respondents reported feeling safe on campus (87.76%), believed 
their campuses were safe (75.51%), and believed that active shooter incidents were 
unlikely to occur on their campuses (54.08%). These findings were consistent with the 
findings from The National Center for Campus Public Safety (2016) in that participants 
believed that a major crisis situation would not occur on their campuses. There appears to 
be a false sense of safety among most of the respondents because the literature indicated 
that IHLs are areas of high criminal activity (Epstein, 2002; Farahany, 2004; Foster & 
Lipka, 2007; Fox & Savage, 2009; Lake, 2007; Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011) and it 
indicated that active shooter situations were more likely to occur in educational settings 
(Blair & Scheweit, 2013; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016; Johnson et al., 2016). In 
conjunction with Bandura’s SCT, maintaining the idea that active shooter incidents were 
unlikely on college campuses may leave faculty at a disadvantage because they will be 
less likely to prepare for active shooter incidents. At institutions where AST is optional, 
faculty may choose not to participate in AST because they maintain the belief that they 
will not be involved in active shooter situation while on campus.  
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Contrary to the beliefs held by the participants in the research study conducted by 
The National Center for Campus Public Safety (2016), 44.90% of FASPS respondents 
believed that it was likely for an active shooter incident to occur on their campus and 
1.02% believed it was extremely likely. These findings indicated that FASPS respondents 
were more aware of the threats to campus safety than the participants in the 2016 study. 
This awareness may be a result of the increase of active shooter incidents in the media 
and the increase of AST at IHLs. Increased awareness improves the likelihood that 
faculty will participate in AST and use precautionary behaviors.  
As expected, most respondents (62.24%) indicated some level of fear regarding 
active shooters on campus. Only 7.14% of FASPS respondents reported that they or their 
immediate family members have previously been involved in an active shooter situation 
while on campus and 9.18% reported that they or their immediate family members have 
previously been involved in an active shooter situation off campus. However, 94.90% of 
respondents have viewed media coverage of active shooter incidents on college 
campuses. Based on SCT, media exposure served as vicarious learning experiences for 
the respondents. Findings support the notion that affective learning occurs through 
vicarious experiences (Bandura, 1986). Findings indicated that, exposure to casualties 
and devastation caused by active shooters on other campuses through the media 
contributed to the respondents’ fear.   
With regard to active shooter preparedness, more respondents reported some level 
of active shooter preparedness (51.02%) than unpreparedness (48.98%). Although the 
differences are miniscule, these differences are due in part to the presence of AST. 
Respondents who received AST were more prepared (69.64%) than those that did not 
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receive AST (26.19%). These findings suggested that active shooter preparedness is 
influenced by AST. When comparing these findings to prior research, FASPS 
respondents were more prepared for active shooters than the faculty in research 
conducted by Bishop (2013), Lott (2012), and Liu et al. (2015). In the aforementioned 
studies faculty perceived themselves as being unprepared for active shooter incidents. 
The differences in the perceptions of active shooter preparedness between FASPS 
respondents and faculty from previous research may be due in part to an increase in AST 
at IHLs over the past couple of years. FASPS findings supported the literature that 
suggested that AST prepares faculty for active shooter situations (Action Guide for 
Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; Glover, 2016; 
Howard, 2015; Johnson et al., 2016; U.S. Department of Education, 2010; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008; Zdziarski, 2016). 
As mentioned in chapter two, Bandura (1986) found that forethought regulates 
human behavior. Almost all of the FASPS respondents (92.86%) have thought about 
encountering an active shooter on campus and the actions they would need to take if an 
active shooter entered their office or classroom. According to SCT, the respondents’ 
forethought regarding active shooter situations on campus serves as a guide for their 
actions and a mechanism for their personal motivation (Bandura, 1986). The respondents’ 
thoughts about being involved in active shooter incidents were mental representations 
that impacted their behaviors (Bandura, 1986). Faculty who envisioned themselves in 
active shooter situations in the future were more likely to participate in AST, were more 
likely to pay greater attention during training, and were more likely to use precautionary 
behaviors.  
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In addition to that, most respondents (85.71%) expressed some level of concern 
regarding the potential threat of active shooters on campus. This concern may be due to 
the fact that they had not been fully trained and a culture of preparedness had not been 
established at their institution. Providing a full range of AST may possibly alleviate some 
of the respondents’ concern. Participating in a full range of AST would provide 
respondents with the opportunity to ask questions, receive feedback, learn survival 
tactics, learn procedures, and practice what they have learned (Action Guide for 
Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, 2010; U.S. Department of 
Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013).  
Generally, 95.92% of the respondents believed that AST was important to some 
degree and more than half of the respondents that received AST (62.50% ) reported 
paying high levels of attention during training. Bandura (1986) noted that people give 
high levels of attention to situations that they believe they will one day encounter. 
However, only 45.92% of respondents believed that active shooter incidents were likely 
to occur on their campuses. This finding contradicted that notion that only people who 
believe a situation is likely to occur in the future will provide a high level of attention. 
Respondents that provide high levels of attention during AST benefit the most from 
training because for them learning is enhanced. 
Findings revealed that observational learning was occurring during AST. Only 
16.33% of respondents indicated that they did not learn from watching their colleagues 
engage in AST. This finding supported Bandura’s (1986) claim that people can learn 
vicariously through observing others’ behaviors and through observing the consequences 
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associated with other people’s actions. By observing the behaviors of others, respondents 
learn how to respond to, deter, and/or engage in active shooter situations.  
Findings from the FASPS also revealed a link between AST and self-efficacy 
because respondents’ self-efficacy improved after receiving AST. Faculty that were 
confident in their ability to handle active shooters were more likely to perform optimally 
during active shooter situations as long as their self-efficacy is not miscalibrated. 
Bandura (1986) noted that successes and failures influenced self-efficacy. Participating in 
operations-based active shooter exercises give faculty the opportunity to build their self-
efficacy. The lack of the use of operations-based exercises prohibit faculty from fully 
developing their self-efficacy. This indicated that respondents who did not participate in 
operations-based training exercises may have a false sense of preparedness and their self-
efficacy may be miscalibrated because they lacked actual experience responding to active 
shooter situations.  
Research Question 4 
What precautionary measures do faculty take to demonstrate active shooter preparedness? 
Overall, only 45.92% of the respondents believed that active shooter incidents 
were likely to occur on their campuses. However, all of the respondents indicated that 
they used some sort of precautionary measure to deter active shooters. The potential 
threat of active shooters only motivated 57.14% of respondents to take precautionary 
actions while on campus. Additional research is needed to determine what motivated the 
other 42.86% of respondents to use precautionary measures.  
Respondents used a variety of precautionary measures. Prior to receiving AST, 
opting into campus safety texts or email alerts was the most frequently used 
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precautionary measure used by the respondents. This was followed by being alert and 
aware of one’s surroundings, being knowledgeable of evacuation routes, locking office 
doors, and promptly reporting suspicious persons, vehicles, or activity. Comparatively, 
after participating in AST; being alert and aware of one’s surroundings, being 
knowledgeable of evacuation routes, opting into campus safety texts or email alerts, 
being knowledgeable of active shooter response procedures, promptly reporting 
suspicious persons, vehicles, or activity, and locking office doors were the most 
frequently used precautionary measures used by the respondents. Findings indicated that 
participating in AST caused respondents to become more aware of active shooter 
response procedures because there was an increase in the respondents’ awareness of 
procedures after receiving AST . 
Meaning of the Findings 
Overall, faculty were underprepared for active shooter incidents. There was a 
considerable number of respondents that did not receive AST from their institution. 
Likewise, there was a considerable of number of respondents that continued to perceive 
themselves as being unprepared for active shooter situations in spite of receiving AST. 
Although findings from the current research and from previous research show that active 
shooter preparation efforts at IHLs have drastically improved since Virginia Tech, more 
improvements are needed to ensure that all faculty are aware of active shooter policies 
and are prepared for active shooter incidents through effective training. A little more than 
half of the respondents reported that they are prepared for active shooter situations 
however, findings pertaining to the nature of AST revealed that respondents may not be 
as prepared as they believe themselves to be because they are not practicing procedures, 
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evacuation plans, or survival tactics. Institutional active shooter preparation efforts 
appeared to be lacking because discussions-based trainings were not being consistently 
conducted, operations-based trainings were rarely conducted, and most faculty were 
unsure of active shooter procedures.  
Implications 
The current research study has numerous theoretical and practical implications. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the findings provided support for the use of Bandura’s 
(1986) SCT as a framework to examine active shooter preparedness. The findings 
indicated that active shooter preparedness involved the reciprocal interaction between 
respondents’ environment, behaviors, and personal and cognitive factors. Findings from 
the FASPS solidified the use of triadic reciprocal determinism to investigate and explain 
the interaction between the variables that contributed to active shooter preparedness 
(Bandura, 1986). From a practical standpoint, findings from the FASPS identified 
strengths and deficiencies in the active shooter preparation efforts at IHLs. Compared to 
the literature, active shooter preparation efforts have improved at IHLs. However, 
findings revealed the need for the DOE to push IHLs to mandate AST for all institutions. 
In conjunction with that, the DOE should encourage all IHLs to create a culture of 
preparedness toward active shooters on all campuses. At the institutional level, the 
frequencies of AST need to be improved. AST should also be expanded to include a full 
range of training exercises as it is recommended by the DHS and DOE. Doing so makes 
active shooter preparation efforts more effective. There is also a need for IHLs to assess 
the effectiveness of ASTs.  
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Findings revealed the need for administrators at IHLs to ensure that faculty have 
access to active shooter policies and are aware of active shooter procedures. 
Administrators should ensure that active shooter response procedures and evacuation 
plans are tested each year. With regard to faculty, findings indicated that faculty are 
thinking about the potential threat of active shooters and their role in active shooter 
preparedness. The findings of the FASPS showed a link between the environment, 
personal and cognitive factors, and behaviors that contributed to active shooter 
preparedness. This research may serve as a benchmark for future analysis in that it serves 
as a useful starting point by examining the variables associated with active shooter 
preparedness.  
Limitations 
There are several limitations associated with the current research study. The first 
limitation involved the sampling method. A non-probability sampling method was used 
to select members from the target population. As a result, there is an unknown portion of 
the target population that was not included in the study. The findings of the current 
research cannot be generalized to the larger population of faculty at IHLs.  
The second limitation involved recruitment. The current research study was 
conducted at the end of the Spring semester. Conducting the research study at the end of 
academic year limited the number of participants. At the time of the recruitment, some 
institutions were already on summer break, as a result some faculty did not view the 
recruitment email. The researcher received several automated response emails that 
indicated that institutions were already on summer break. The automated response emails 
also stated that faculty would not be checking their intuitional email during that time. 
 99 
Conducting this study at the beginning or middle of the Spring semester may have 
improved the response rate.  
The third limitation associated with the study is that the instrument lacked internal 
consistency and thus needed to be reorganized to improve clarity for the respondents. As 
a result of this limitation, some of the respondents’ answer choices were inconsistent. 
Additionally, a standard unit of measurement should have been used on the response 
items in order to improve clarity for respondents and consistency during the data analysis.  
The fourth limitation deals with  the absence of baseline data. Baseline data 
obtained from administering a survey to faculty prior to receiving active shooter training 
would have permitted the researcher to make certain inferences regarding the extent to 
which AST influences faculty members’ personal and cognitive factors, behaviors, and 
environments. Without the baseline data, the researcher could not determine the extent to 
which faculty active shooter preparedness was a result of participating in active shooter 
training. The researcher also could not adequately determine if faculty behaviors changed 
as a result of participating in AST.  
The final limitation associated with this study is that the researcher did not 
administer AST to the participants. The type of training received, training content, and 
frequency of trainings varied by institution. The variation in AST limited the conclusions 
that could be made regarding the relationship between AST and active shooter 
preparedness. This also prevented the researcher from determining why respondents 
employed by private IHLs felt safer and perceived themselves as more prepared than 
respondents from public IHLs. 
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Directions for Future Research 
The current research study examined the active shooter preparedness of 
postsecondary faculty. Prior studies explored crisis management at IHLs (Akers, 2007; 
Lott, 2012; Booker, 2014; Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011; Sullivan, 2012; Sullivan & Perry, 
2014; Wang & Hutchins, 2010; Zdziarski, 2001), AST at IHLs (Ellies, 2015; Snyder, 
2014), and active shooter preparedness at IHLs (Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; Mitroff et. al., 
2006; Myers, 2016; Pitrowski, 2014). The current study filled the gap in research by 
revealing the current state of active shooter preparation efforts among IHLs, by assessing 
faculty perceptions of their active shooter preparedness, and by revealing the factors that 
may have contributed to active shooter preparedness. However, the limitations associated 
with this study prohibited the researcher from making certain assertions. Additional 
research is needed to further examine institutional preparation efforts, AST, and the link 
between active shooter training and active shooter preparedness.   
 The findings from the current research revealed that faculty employed by private 
IHLs felt safer on campus than faculty employed by public IHLs. Future research should 
be conducted to determine if this finding remains within a larger more representative 
sample. Future research should also be conducted to investigate why faculty at private 
IHLs feel safer than faculty at public IHLs. Examining the difference between the crisis 
preparedness efforts and campus structures of public and private IHLs may help 
determine how to improve active shooter preparation efforts, so that faculty from public 
IHLs are more prepared and feel safer on campus.  
 Findings also revealed that a substantial percentage of respondents still perceived 
themselves as being underprepared for active shooter situations despite having 
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participated in AST. Additional research should be conducted to determine if this finding 
was due to deficiencies in the AST received by these respondents or due to some other 
factors. The lack of preparedness by respondents who received AST revealed the need for 
additional research regarding the components of AST at IHLs and the effectiveness of 
AST at IHLs. In addition to this finding, prior research also indicated that information 
regarding the components of AST and the effectiveness of AST is missing from the 
literature. Research conducted by Akers (2007) and the National Center for Campus 
Public Safety (2016) revealed that postsecondary personnel believed that crisis 
preparedness training needed to be improved. Future research might be helpful to further 
examine the areas where there are deficiencies in AST and to identify the limitations of 
AST. This information will help improve active shooter preparation efforts at IHLs.  
Lastly, future research is needed to determine the extent to which active shooter 
training is related to active shooter preparedness. Knowing the extent to which AST 
makes a difference in active shooter preparedness may encourage more IHLs to provide 
AST to their faculty. The findings of the FASPS indicated that respondents who had AST 
perceived themselves as being more prepared to manage active shooter situations than 
respondents who did not. Additionally, research should be conducted in this area to 
determine the extent to which the different types of ASTs causes a change in levels of 
active shooter preparedness. This information will help determine if modeling, role play, 
simulations, games, drills, functional exercises, and full-scale exercises have any 
measurable effects on the active shooter preparedness of personnel at IHLs. Knowing 
how AST relates to preparedness helps support the argument for providing consistent 
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AST to faculty. This information would also help IHLs select the most effective types of 
AST and obtain greater results from the training.  
Summary 
This chapter provided a discussion of the research findings presented in chapter 
four. Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) was also used to explore the 
environmental, behavioral, personal and cognitive factors that contributed to faculty 
member’s active shooter preparedness. These factors were discussed in relation to SCT in 
efforts to describe the current state of faculty active shooter preparedness. In this chapter, 
the findings of the FASPS have been compared to the crisis preparedness literature in 
higher education, the crisis preparedness recommendations of the Higher Education Act, 
and the active shooter preparation recommendations of DHS to determine the current 
state of faculty active shooter preparedness.  
Conclusion 
This research study used Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory as a framework to 
examine active shooter preparedness among faculty from IHLs within the United States. 
Using a quantitative approach, the researcher determined the nature of AST at IHLs and 
the current state of faculty active shooter preparedness. Findings showed that online 
trainings and seminars were the most common types of AST respondents received. In 
addition to that, AST was not provided on a consistent basis throughout the academic 
year. Findings from the FASPS revealed that some IHLs are still not fully compliant with 
the Higher Education Act’s recommendations for crisis preparedness because only 57% 
of the sample received active shooter training and active shooter policies were only 
shared with 52%. In addition to those findings the majority of  the respondents had not 
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participated in any type of operations-based training exercises. The failure to provide 
operations-based training is contrary to the recommendations of the DHS and the DOE. 
As a result of these findings, improvements are still needed in the preparation of faculty 
to deter or engage in active shooter incidents.  
Generally, most of the sample believed their campuses were safe. However, the 
majority of the sample had thought about being the possibility of being involved in an 
active shooter incident while on campus. Findings from the FASPS revealed that a little 
more than half of the sample believed they were prepared for active shooter situations. 
Respondents that perceived themselves as prepared to engage in active shooter situation 
had more AST, were less fearful, were more likely to employ precautionary behaviors, 
felt safer on campus, perceived their campuses to be safer, thought about the possibility 
of being involved in an active shooter incident while on campus, and have thought about 
the actions that they would need to take in the event of an actives shooter. Lastly, the 
results of the FASPS revealed that respondents employed by private IHLs felt safer on 
campus and perceived themselves as more prepared to handle active shooter situations 
than respondents employed by public IHLs. However, in the absences of practice, 
respondents may not actually be as prepared as they perceived themselves to be.  
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APPENDIX A – List of Contacted IHLs 
University of Mobile 
University of Alaska Southeast 
Arizona Christian University 
John Brown University 
San Diego City College 
University of Denver 
University of Connecticut 
University of Delaware 
University of D.C. 
North Florida Community College 
Georgia Piedmont Technical 
College 
University of Hawaii 
University of Idaho 
Highland Community College 
University of Notre Dame 
Drake University 
Hesston College 
University of Pikeville 
Tulane University 
University of Maine 
Johns Hopkins University 
Massbay Community College 
Monroe Community College 
Normandale Community College 
University of Mississippi 
State Fair Community College 
 
University of Montana 
University of Nebraska Lincoln 
University of Nevada Las Vegas 
University of New Hampshire 
Saint Peters University 
University of New Mexico 
Guttman Community College 
Central Carolina Community College 
North Dakota State University 
Cuyahoga Community College 
Oral Roberts University 
Concordia University 
Butler Community College 
University of Rhode Island 
Anderson University 
University of South Dakota 
Nashville State Community College 
Tarrant County College 
Utah State University 
University of Vermont 
Blue Ridge Community College 
Seattle University  
West Virginia University 
Marquette University 
University of Wyoming 
 
 105 
APPENDIX B – IRB Approval Letter 
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APPENDIX C – Recruitment Email 
Subject: Participation Request for Faculty Active Shooter Preparedness Survey  
 Greetings, 
  I am Latisha L. Pitts, a Ph.D. candidate in Higher Education Administration at 
The University of Southern Mississippi. I would like to invite the faculty at your 
institution to participate a research study. The FBI reported that between the years of 
2000-2013, 70% of all active shooter incidents occurred in an educational setting (Blair 
& Scheweit, 2013). This finding along with recent active shooter incidents at institutions 
of higher learning have sparked my interest in faculty active shooter preparedness.  
The purpose of this research study is to gather a snapshot of the current state of 
active shooter preparedness among faculty at institutions of higher learning. Participation 
in this study is voluntary and may be withdrawn at any time. Faculty who choose to 
participate in this study will be asked questions about their exposure to active shooter 
incidents, the nature of active shooter training at their institution, and their perspectives 
regarding active shooter preparation efforts. Responses to this questionnaire will remain 
anonymous. The data gathered from this study will be analyzed and used in my 
dissertation; which is titled, “Preparation matters: An examination of faculty active 
shooter preparedness.”   
I would greatly appreciate if you and your colleagues would complete my 
questionnaire. It should take no longer than 15 minutes to complete.  Please forward this 
email which includes the link to the questionnaire to all the faculty within your college, 
department, or division. 
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To complete the questionnaire, click here: 
https://usmep.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bfIWABA6lNGlBB3 
  By completing and submitting this questionnaire you are giving consent for your 
responses to be included in the research study. Please view the attached information letter 
and IRB approval letter for additional information. 
  If you have any questions about this research, please contact me at 
latisha.brown@usm.edu. 
This study has been reviewed and approved by The University of Southern 
Mississippi Institutional Review Board.  
Thank you,  
Latisha L. Pitts 
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APPENDIX D – Information Letter 
Dear Faculty, 
I would like to ask you to consider participating in a study because you are a 
faculty member at an institution of higher learning and teach on a college campus. The 
purpose of this study is to examine faculty active shooter preparedness at institutions of 
higher learning within the United States. This examination is being performed to obtain a 
snapshot of the current state of faculty active shooter preparedness. I intend to explore 
faculty active shooter preparedness by examining faculty beliefs, behaviors, and personal 
and cognitive factors. The results of this research may help refine active shooter 
preparation efforts, may add to the body of literature pertaining to the active shooter 
preparation of faculty, and may serve as a basis for future evaluation of active shooter 
preparation efforts. 
If you choose to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a 
questionnaire. The questionnaire will gauge faculty beliefs towards organization 
vulnerability, safety, fear, and active shooter training. It will also ask questions about 
various types of active shooter trainings and precautionary behaviors. The questionnaire 
should take less than 15 minutes to complete. 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. There are minimal risks 
involved with participating in this study. Participants may experience discomfort if they 
have been directly or indirectly involved in an active shooter situation. Participants may 
withdraw their participation at any time without penalty or prejudice. 
All data collection associated with this study will remain completely anonymous. 
Any identifying information inadvertently obtained during the course of this study will 
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remain completely confidential. The data and information collected from this study will 
be used to add to the body of knowledge pertaining to active shooter preparedness at 
institutions of higher learning. The data collected from this research will be analyzed and 
reported in the researcher’s dissertation. The results from this research may also be 
presented in publications and at educational conferences. After analyzed, the data 
collected from this research will be saved by the researcher on Dropbox and on an 
external drive. 
If you have questions concerning this research, please contact Latisha Pitts at 
Latisha.Brown@usm.edu. This research is being conducted under the supervision of Eric 
Platt, Ph.D. 
This project has been reviewed by the Human Subjects Protection Review 
Committee, which ensures that research projects involving human subjects follow federal 
regulations. Any questions or concerns about rights as a research participant should be 
directed to the Chair of the Institutional Review Board, The University of Southern 
Mississippi, 118 College Drive #5147, Hattiesburg, MS 39406-0001, (601) 266-6820. 
By completing and returning the questionnaire, the respondent gives permission 
for this anonymous and confidential data to be used for the purposes described above. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Sincerely, 
Latisha L. Pitts 
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APPENDIX E – FASPS 
Demographics 
Q1.1 How old are you? 
Q1.2 Gender 
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
Transgender  (3)  
I prefer not to specify.  (4)  
Q1.3 What is your race? Please select all that apply.  
White  (1)  
African American/Black  (2)  
Native American/American Indian  (3)  
Hispanic/Latino  (4)  
Asian/Pacific Islander  (5)  
Other  (6)  
Q1.4 Professional Rank 
Adjunct/Lecturer  (1)  
Assistant Professor  (2)  
Associate Professor  (3)  
Full Professor  (4)  
Professor Emeritus  (5)  
Q1.5 How many years have you served as a faculty member at your current institution? 
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Q1.6 Indicate the type of institution you are employed at.  
Community College /Junior College  (1)  
University  (2)  
Other  (3)  
Q1.7 Indicate if your institution is public or private.  
Public  (1)  
Private  (2)  
Q1.8 Indicate where your institution is located. 
▼ Alabama (1) ... Wyoming (51) 
 
Q1.9 An active shooter situation is an incident where someone is actively engaged in 
killing or attempting to kill people with a firearm in a confined and populated area.  
Have you or any member of your immediate family ever been involved in an active 
shooter situation while on a college campus? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
Q1.10 Have you or any member of your immediate family ever been involved in an 
active shooter situation outside of a college campus? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
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Q1.11 Have you viewed media coverage of an active shooter situation that occurred on a 
college campus? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
Q1.12 Is participating in active shooter training optional or mandatory at your institution? 
Optional  (1)  
Mandatory  (2)  
The Nature of Active Shooter Trainings 
Q2.1 Active shooter training prepares individuals to prevent and engage in active shooter 
situations. Active shooter training includes; seminars, workshops, web-based training, 
games, drills, tabletop exercises, functional exercises, and full-scale exercises. Have you 
received active shooter training from your institution? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
Q2.2 How many active shooter trainings have you had during the 2017-2018 academic 
year? 
Q2.3 Generally, about how long does the active shooter training sessions last? 
Less than 1 hour  (1)  
More than 1 hour  (2)  
2 or more hours  (3)  
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Q2.4 During active shooter drills, participants practice how to respond to active shooter 
incidents while on campus. How many active shooter drills that involve faculty are 
conducted at your institution each year? 
Q2.5 Functional active shooter exercises are an extension of active shooter drills. During 
functional exercises, the campus community participates in realistic active shooter 
simulations. How many functional exercises that involve faculty are conducted at your 
institution each year? 
Q2.6 Full scale training exercises are an extension of functional exercises. During full 
scale exercises, faculty, staff, students, emergency responders, and community 
stakeholders engage in realistic active shooter simulations. How many full-scale training 
exercises are conducted at your institution each year? 
Q2.7 Indicate the active shooter training exercises that you have participated in at your 
institution. Please select all that apply.  
Seminars  (1)  
Workshops  (2)  
Tabletop Exercises  (3)  
Games  (4)  
Drills  (5)  
Functional Exercises  (6)  
Full Scale Exercises  (7)  
Online Training  (8)  
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Q2.8 Indicate the components that have been included in the active shooter trainings that 
you have received.  Please select all that apply. 
Lecturer/Verbal Training  (1)  
Group Discussion  (2)  
Simulations  (3)  
Role Play  (4)  
Games  (5)  
Modeling  (6)  
Videos  (7)  
Survival Tactics  (8)  
Reading  (9)  
Scenarios  (10)  
News Media  (11)  
Q2.9 Indicate which of the following tactics have been modeled during the active shooter 
trainings that you have participated in. Please select all that apply. 
"Run, Hide, Fight"  (1)  
"Avoid, Deny, Defend"  (2)  
"Lock Down"  (3)  
"See Something, Say Something"  (4)  
Q2.10 Have you been given the opportunity to ask questions during the training sessions? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
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Q2.11 Have you been given the opportunity to provide feedback after the training 
sessions? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
Faculty Perspectives Regarding Organizational Vulnerability and Preparedness 
Q3.1 Has a culture of preparedness towards the threat of an active shooter been 
established on your campus?  
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
Q3.2 Does your institution have active shooter policies? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
Unsure  (3)  
Q3.3 Have institutional active shooter policies been shared with you? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
Q3.4 Do you feel safe on your campus? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
Q3.5 How safe do you perceive your campus to be.  
Very safe  (1)  
Somewhat safe  (2)  
Neutral  (3)  
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Somewhat unsafe  (4)  
Very unsafe  (5)  
Q3.6 What is the likelihood that an active shooter incident could occur on your campus? 
Extremely likely  (1)  
Likely  (2)  
Unlikely  (3)  
Extremely unlikely  (4)  
Q3.7 Please rate your level of fear of being involved in an active shooter situation on 
campus. 
Extremely fearful  (1)  
Fearful  (2)  
Slightly fearful  (3)  
Not fearful  (4)  
Q3.8 College campuses are open access environments which means that college 
campuses are open to the public and have many unlocked buildings and classroom doors.  
Knowing this, how likely are you to employ precautionary behaviors? 
Extremely likely  (1)  
Likely  (2)  
Unlikely  (3)  
Extremely unlikely  (4)  
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Q3.9 How much does employing precautionary behaviors affect the campus community? 
Major affect  (1)  
Moderate affect  (2)  
Minor affect  (3)  
No affect  (4)  
Q3.10 In your opinion, how prepared are you to engage in active shooter situations? 
Extremely prepared  (1)  
Somewhat prepared  (2)  
Somewhat unprepared  (3)  
Extremely unprepared  (4)  
Q3.11 In your opinion, how prepared are faculty members to engage in active shooter 
situations? 
Extremely prepared  (1)  
Somewhat prepared  (2)  
Somewhat unprepared  (3)  
Extremely unprepared  (4)  
Forethought 
Q4.1 Have you ever thought about the possibility of being involved in an active shooter 
situation while on campus? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
 
 118 
Q4.2 Have you ever thought about the actions you would need to take if an active shooter 
enters your office or classroom? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
Q4.3 How concerned are you about active shooters on campus? 
Extremely concerned  (1)  
Moderately concerned  (2)  
Somewhat concerned  (3)  
Slightly concerned  (4)  
Not at all concerned  (5)  
Thoughts About Training 
Q5.1 How important do you believe active shooter trainings are? 
Extremely important  (1)  
Very important  (2)  
Moderately important  (3)  
Slightly important  (4)  
Not at all important  (5)  
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Q5.2 What level of attention do you provide during active shooter trainings? 
High  (1)  
Medium  (2)  
Low  (3)  
None  (4)  
I have not had active shooter training.  (5)  
Q5.3 Do you believe that you learn from watching your colleagues engage in active 
shooter exercises? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
I have not had active shooter training.  (3)  
Q5.4 How useful do you find the information that is shared during active shooter 
training? 
Extremely useful  (1)  
Very useful  (2)  
Moderately useful  (3)  
Slightly useful  (4)  
Not at all useful  (5)  
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Behaviors 
Q6.1 Does the potential threat of an active shooter motivate you to take precautionary  
measure while on campus? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
Q6.2 Indicate the level of influence you believe your actions will have on an active 
shooter situation. 
Extremely influential  (1)  
Very influential  (2)  
Slightly influential  (3)  
Somewhat influential  (4)  
Not at all influential  (5)  
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Q6.3 With regard to active shooters, what precautionary actions did you take to ensure 
campus safety before you had any type of active shooter training? Please select all that 
apply. 
Opted into campus safety text or email alerts  (1)  
Programmed the contact number for campus police in your cellphone  (2)  
Promptly report any suspicious persons, vehicles, or activity  (3)  
Knowledgeable of evacuation routes  (4)  
Locking office doors  (5)  
Locking classroom doors  (6)  
Being alert and aware of surroundings  (7)  
Taking self-defense classes  (8)  
Participating in active shooter training exercises  (9)  
Knowledgeable of active shooter response procedures  (10)  
I did not take any precautionary actions  (11)  
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Q6.4 After receiving active shooter training, what precautionary actions do you currently 
take to ensure safety on campus? Please select all that apply. 
Opted into campus safety text or email alerts  (1)  
Programmed the contact number for campus police in your cellphone  (2)  
Promptly report any suspicious persons, vehicles, or activity  (3)  
Knowledgeable of evacuation routes  (4)  
Locking office doors  (5)  
Locking classroom doors  (6)  
Being alert and aware of surroundings  (7)  
Taking self-defense classes  (8)  
Participating in active shooter training exercises  (9)  
Knowledgeable of active shooter response procedures  (10)  
I do not take any precautionary actions  (11)  
I have not received active shooter training  (12)  
Self-Efficacy 
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Q7.1 Prior to participating in active shooter training, how confident were you in your 
ability to perform the necessary actions during active shooter situations? 
Extremely confident  (1)  
Moderately confident  (2)  
Slightly confident  (3)  
Somewhat confident  (4)  
Not at all confident  (5)  
I have not had active shooter training.  (6)  
Q7.2 Prior to participating in active shooter training, how confident were you in your 
ability to perform the necessary actions after an active shooter situations? 
Extremely confident  (1)  
Moderately confident  (2)  
Slightly confident  (3)  
Somewhat confident  (4)  
Not at all confident  (5)  
I have not had active shooter training.  (6)  
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Q7.3 After participating in active shooter training, how confident are you in your ability 
to perform the necessary actions during an active shooter situation? 
Extremely confident  (1)  
Moderately confident  (2)  
Slightly confident  (3)  
Somewhat confident  (4)  
Not at all confident  (5)  
I have not had active shooter training.  (6)  
Q7.4 After participating in active shooter training, how confident are you in your ability 
to perform the necessary actions after an active shooter situations? 
Extremely confident  (1)  
Moderately confident  (2)  
Slightly confident  (3)  
Somewhat confident  (4)  
Not at all confident  (5)  
I have not had active shooter training.  (6)  
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Intent to Transfer 
Q8.1 Indicate the likelihood that you would follow the procedures you learned in active 
shooter training during an active shooter situation. 
Extremely likely  (1)  
Likely  (2)  
Unlikely  (3)  
Extremely unlikely  (4)  
I have not had active shooter training.  (5)  
Q8.2 How many times do you discuss active shooter policies and procedures with your 
students during each academic term? 
Q8.3 Do you include information regarding active shooter threats in your syllabus? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)   
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